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INSANITY AND THE LAW:
TOwARD A RATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
By FRED COHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION**
Statutes were framed and principles of law laid down
regulating the legal relations of the Insane long before
physicians had obtained any accurate notions respecting
their malady; and, as might naturally be expected, error
and injustice have been committed to an incalculable extent
under the sacred name of law.
- Isaac Ray, 1838
What Isaac Ray said over one hundred and fourteen years ago
could be said with equal validity today. Psychiatry has advanced
far beyond its primitive state at the time Isaac Ray wrote. Yet
criminal justice continues as an autonomous system of supernatural
concepts which cannot be defined in terms of experience.
The defense of insanity is but a part of the overriding problems
which the entire body of criminal law presents. It is, however, a
dramatic focal point for those problems and thus merits separate
attention in a nation which is sceptical of drastic changes in exist-
ing institutions.
The defense of insanity in criminal cases is dealt with here
within the larger framework of the concept of criminal responsi-
bility. It was also felt that the existing case law and legislation in
the area should be articulated and analyzed. Colorado cases and
statutes have been emphasized to provide comprehensive coverage
for at least one state, although "the law" in other jurisdictions is
frequently referred to when necessary. Colorado has long been
a leader in enacting progressive rules and procedures for the
mentally ill. It is hoped that a climate which is receptive to objec-
tive appraisal and enactment of needed revisions will continue to
exist. Colorado, Denver in particular, has recently been subjected
to a torrent of newspaper publicity concerning the defense of
insanity. An objective statement of the existing situation appears
to be needed.
Articulation of existing law and procedure serves as a frame-
work for the more important task of proposing reforms. This dual
purpose has, no doubt, contributed to the "unevenness" of the
article. The legal idiom, so necessary to the summary and analysis
of the law, is often inadequate when one attempts to go beyond
its boundaries in search of methodology, data and solutions. When
necessary, the language of the law has been discarded in favor of
the language of the behavioral sciences. If verbal precision has been
sharpened, then no apologies will be necessary.
There is no attempt to restrict the inquiry to the rules of crim-
inal irresponsibility, i.e., insanity. We consider procedural im-
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plementation of the rules, the concept of partial responsibility, men-
tal disorder as a cause of delay in the criminal process and an ap-
proach to the rational development of criminal responsibility. The
problems are complex and the solutions are illusive.
II. TESTS OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Irresponsibility Decision
Insanity, as used in the phrases, "defense of insanity," or "plea
of insanity," is a legal term descriptive of persons demonstrating
such a grossly disordered mental condition that they are not amen-
able, i.e., responsible, to the ordinary processes of the law.1 Insan-
ity and irresponsibility will be used here interchangeably.
Insanity, as a concept, lacks scientific precision or sanction.
2 It
is a legal, not a medical, term and serves as a barrier to meaningful
communication between the doctor and the lawyer.3 We begin to
apprehend reality if insanity is regarded as a label which the crim-
inal law utilizes for manipulative purposes. Implicit in the concepts
of sanity and insanity are the policy goals of criminal law-re-
sponsibility or irresponsibility.
Responsibility for one's conduct presently depends on whether
the actor was of normal competence, capable of, having the requi-
site mens rea.4 The legal tag for normal competence is "sane." In-
sanity expresses just the opposite and characterizes a person as "not
responsible to the law."
Not every unsoundness of mind will result in criminal irrespon-
sibility. Most of the current polemics center about the "legal tests"
of insanity.5 What type and degree of mental disturbance will
qualify as insanity? What is the most appropriate standard to use
in making this decision?
In 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia an-
nounced the momentous Durham rule.6 That case has served to
focus even more attention on the "legal tests" of insanity. Colorado,
along with other jurisdictions, has not remained immune from the
mounting dissatisfaction with current rules and procedures ignited
by Durham.
7
Although the literature is replete with proposals for new tests
of insanity, the current authoritative tests are few. These are the
M'Naghten Rules,' the M'Naghten Rules accompanied by the ir-
1 Brown v. People, 116 Colo. 93, 97, 178 P.2d 948, 950 (1947). "In a criminal case the question
to be resolved is not in fact 'sane or insane?' As to what constitutes insanity the experts, as well
as laymen, radically differ. The question is responsibility."
See also, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 347 (Lindman and McIntyre ed. 1961). Allen, The
Rule of the American Low Institute's Model Penal Code, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 494 (1962).
The qualification "ordinary processes of the low" is used because a successful defense based
on insanity, unlike any other defense, may still result in the individual's subjection to the restraining
authority of the state.
2 Deutsch, The Mentally Ill in America 387 (2d ed. 1949).
3 Roche, The Criminal Mind 15 (Evergreen ed. 1959). Bauer, Legal Responsibility and Mental
Illness, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 12 (1962).
4 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law ch. XIII (2d ed. 1960). Biggs, The Guilty Mind (1955).
5 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 50 (1954).
6 Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
See Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020 (1959); Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462,
352 P.2d 112 (1960).
8 10 Clark and Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
"[Tihe party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know what he was doing was wrong."
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resistible impulse test (Colorado's position at least since 1915),' the
New Hampshire or Durham "product" test,'0 the Currens test"
and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code.12
At the present time, the M'Naghten Rules alone, or supplemented
by the irresistible impulse test, are the exclusive tests of criminal
responsibility in the federal jurisdiction, except the Third Circuit
and the District of Columbia, and in all states except Vermont, New
Hampshire, Maine, Illinois and perhaps Montana.'-
Not more than -fourteen states have coupled irresistible impulse
with M'Naghten.14 Thus Colorado finds itself in rather limited com-
pany, especially when it is noted that Colorado's rule is statutory. 15
The M'Naghten Rules were created by the judiciary and the great
majority of jurisdictions have adopted and maintained the rules
through the judiciary. Colorado, having adopted the rules by legis-
lation, is unique and presents different problems to those who seek
change. It seems clear that any changes in the rule must come from
the legislature. The Supreme Court of Colorado has flatly stated,
"We hold that the test of criminal irresponsibility is for the Gen-
eral Assembly to determine and to change, if indeed it is to be
changed." 16
The irresistible impulse test has certainly not been above
criticism. However, on this aspect of Colorado's present rules, we
9 Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756 (1915).
"Iincapable of distinguishing right from wrong ... incapable of choosing the right and
refraining from doing the wrong. And. this is true howsoever such insanity may be manifested
by insane delusions . . . by irresistible impulse, or otherwise."
10 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 6 'Am. Rep. 533 (1869); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 9 Am. Rep.
242 (1871); Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
"(Iff his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect."
See Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine, 69 Yale L. J. 367 (1960) for a discussion
of the distinction between the two rules.
11 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). This test is similar to the Model Penal
Code: "[T]he defendant as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial caoacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated."
12 §4.01 (Proposed official draft, 1962). [Hereinafter cited, Model Penal Code].
"(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrong-
fulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
"(2) [T]he terms mental disease or defect do not include on abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."
Adopted with revisions, in Vermont and Illinois. Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 13 §4801 (1959); III. Stat.
Ann. ch. 38 §6-2 (1961 Supp.). Also see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 149 §38-A (1961 Supp.).
13 See note 10 supra for the D.C. and New Hampshire tests. The Montana Supreme Court has
wavered between the irresistible impulse test, State v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169 (1899), the
product test, State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362 (1904) and a test of ability to form the requisite
intent, State v. Narich, 92 Mont. 17, 9 P.2d 477 (1932). See Note, Insanity as a Defense in the
Criminal Law of Montana, 1 Mont. L. Rev. 69 (1940).
See also Deutsch, The Mentally Ill In America 396 et. seq. (2d ed. 1949); The Mentally Disabled
And The Low 332 (Lindman and McIntyre ed. 1961); Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal
Defense 68 et. seq. (1954).
14 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mich-
gan, New Mexico, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming. Georgia has a delusional-impulse test.
See Perkins, Criminal Law 762 (1957).
15 Colo. Rev. Stat. 5 39-8-1(2) (1953).
"The applicable test of insanity in such cases shall be, and the jury shall be so instructed: 'A
person who is so diseased in mind at the time of the ct as to be incapable of distinguishing right
from wrong with respect to that act, or being able to so distinguish, has suffered such on impair.
ment of mind by disease as to destroy the will power and render him incapable of choosing the right
and refraining from doing the wrong, is not accountable; and this is true howsoever such insanity
may be manifested, whcher by irresistible impulse or otherwise. But care should be taken not to
confuse such mental dis-ase with moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion growing out of
anger, revenge, hatred or other motives, and kindred evil conditions, for when the act is induced
by any of these causes the person is accountable to law." (Emphasis added.)
This has been the statutory test since 1927 and is identical to the Ryan formulation. See note 9
supra.
16Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 509, 346 P.2d 1020, 1029 (1959).
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find most of the better criticism directed to a scepticism concern-
ing reasons for rejection of the rule.17
"Very rarely, if ever, has any rule of law been so extravagantly
and caustically censured as the 'right and wrong' test of M'Naght-
en's Case. s18 The most cogent criticism of the M'Naghten Rules is
that they fail to effectuate a major policy goal of the criminal law.
They fail to aid in identifying those who are so mentally disordered
as not to be properly responsible to the ordinary criminal pro-
cess.19 Consequently, the criminal law finds itself punishing those
whose punishment is of no positive aid to society. To demonstrate
this is perhaps to prove the entire case against the M'Naghten"right or wrong" formulation.
For many reasons the criminal law, indeed society, is not ready
to accept the view that all criminal behavior is a symptom of mental
illness requiring custody, care and treatment for the actor rather
than punishment.2 However, the law early accepted the view that
there are those who manifest such gross mental abnormality that
this condition ought to be a complete defense to a criminal charge.-'
The problem then is not agreeing on whether a principle of criminal
irresponsibility based on mental disorder exists. On this point
everyone agrees. The problem is the utility of the M'Naghten
formulation as an aid to decision-makers in selecting the proper
persons under this principle.
Concepts of "right or wrong" are said to belong to ethics.
22
This criticism appears to have validity when we consider the ex-
perts' role in the courtroom. When the psychiatrist is asked if the
accused knew the difference between right and wrong, it seems
obvious that he is being asked to measure the accused by some
ethical, rather than medical, standard. The doctor is no more profes-
sionally prepared to state ethical judgments than the other court-
room participants.
Weihofen criticizes the ethical component of M'Naghten be-
cause of the ephemeral nature of ethical beliefs and the difficulty
of knowing right from wrong in the complex conflict-culture of
our time.2 3 This is a questionable basis for criticism. The entire body
of criminal law bears some imperfect relation to the community's
ethical beliefs. As such, it is subject to the problems of change in-
17 Weihofen, note 13 supra at 94; Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry And The Low 408, 409
(1952).
"The view that certain impulses which result from mental disorder may be 'irresistible' has
formidable medical support. Opinions contrary to this view are held by 'relatively few members
of the profession.' " The Mentally Disabled and the Low 340 (lindman and McIntyre ed. 1961) and
authorities cited therein,
Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Low, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 956 (1952).
Wertham, The Show Of Violence 13-14 (1949) is the most outspoken medical critic of the rule.
18 Harno, Some Significant Developments in Criminal Low and Procedure in the Lost Century,
42 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 427, 433 (1951).
See Weihofen, note 13 supra at 65, n.36 (1954) for "a few of the numberless books and articles
discussing the M'Naghten case rules."
19 Guttmacher and Weihofen. op. cit. supra note 17, at 420. This same notion, stated in varying
forms, may be found in many sources. But see Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 481 (2d ed.
1960) and State v. White, 374 P.2d 942 (Wash. 1962) for an affirmation of the M'Naghten rules.
20 One reason is the great shortage of personnel in public mental hospitals throughout the
country. The American Psychiatric Association's survey, in 1956, revealed a critical nationwide need
for 63,341 employees including physicians, psychologists, registered nurses, other nurses, attendants
and social workers. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1957, p. 38, Col. 1 quoted in Donnelly, Goldstein and
Schwartz, Criminal Law 59 (1962).
21 "By Edward Ill's reign. 1326 to 1327. camplete madness was a defense to a criminal charge.
Until then at least, the insane criminal's life could be saved only by the pardon of the king." Biggs,
The Guilty Mind 83 (1955).
22 Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 13, at 65; Guttmacher and Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 17, at
406.
23 Weihofen, op. cit, supra note 13, at 65.66.
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herent in any dynamic system. A major problem for criminal law
is its failure to keep pace with changes in community sentiment and
achieve a balance between this sentiment and objectively deter-
mined policy goals.24 The M'Naghten Rules, as an ethical state-
ment, must endure only that amount of criticism which is directed
to the whole of criminal law.
When Daniel M'Naghten shot and killed Drummond, private
secretary to Sir Robert Peel, he believed that he was killing Peel.
M'Naghten had delusions of persecution and believed that Peel
was one of his enemies. The excitement engendered upon his
acquittal by reason of insanity led to debate in the House of Lords
and ultimately to the now famous advisory opinion of the Judges of
England.
M'Naghten is thought to have been a paranoiac who suffered
from delusions.25 Consequently, the questions that were framed
and the Judges' responses were primarily concerned with "de-
lusional insanity." There is good reason to believe that the Judges
never intended their formulation to encompass cases of mental
disorder other than those manifested by delusions.
2 6
In amplification of the "right and wrong" test, the Judges stated
further that,
Where a person 'labours under partial delusions only and
is not in other respects insane,' and commits an offense in
consequence thereof, 'he must be considered in the same
situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to
which the delusion exists were real.'
27
The fallacy of determining the criminality of conduct by stand-
ards applicable to normal persons was early perceived in Colorado.
The Ryan2 case was the first to consider the partial delusion aspect
of M'Naghten and it was firmly rejected. The jury had been in-
structed in almost the identical terms of M'Naghten and the
defendant objected. The supreme court found that the jury could
scarcely have failed to be misled since Ryan's delusions would not
have been a justification for the killing if his apprehensions were
based on fact.29 Retreating somewhat, the court indicated that the
instruction need not always constitute prejudicial error but "in
such case it has no application, states a wrong principle of law, and
should not be given.
'30
1
Any uncertainty about possible nonprejudicial situations was
removed the next year. The Oldham3 1 case involved the same
instruction and the same delusional situation, the delusion not
being a defense to a killing if real. The court conceded that non-
prejudicial error was possible, "but as it embodies an incorrect legal
principle, it ought not to be given at all."'32 Thus, from "should not
be given" to "ought not be given at all," we read the short Colorado
history of the M'Naghten Rules on partial delusion and their epitaph.
24 Rose and Prell, Does The Punishment Fit the Crime? 61 Amer. J. of Soc. 247 (1955).
25 Weihofen, op. cit. supro note 13, at 64.
26 Glueck, Mental Dir.rder and the Criminal Law 166 (1925).
27 As set out in Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 13, at 62.
28 Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 Pac. 756 (1915).
29 Id. at 427-28, 153 Pac. at 757.
30 Id. at 428, 153 Poc. at 757.
31 Oldham . People, 61 Colo. 413, 158 Poc. 148 (1916).
32 Id. at 415, 158 Pac. at 149.
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In rejecting the "partial delusion test," however, Colorado did
not necessarily free itself from criticism that the "right and wrong"
formulation itself was to deal only with delusional insanity. The
first question posed for the Judges asked for the law respecting
crimes committed under insane delusions. The Judges replied that
such a person was responsible, "if he knew at the time of committing
such crime that he was acting contrary to law .... the law of the
land.
33
How the partial and "complete" delusion rules were intended to
operate is not clear. It is clear that Colorado has rejected the partial
insanity test.34 To the extent that the "right and wrong" test itself
was intended to deal only with delusions and not other types of
mental illness, ColoradQ perpetuates the error. The test is used to
cover any symptomatic mental disorder.
The M'Naghten test is based on an entirely obsolete and
misleading conception of the nature of insanity, since in-
sanity does not only, or primarily, affect the cognitive or
intellectual faculties, but affects the whole personality of the
patient, including both the will and the emotions. An insane
person may therefore often know the nature and quality of
his act and that it is wrong and forbidden by law, but yet
commit it as a result of the mental disease.
35
Underlying this statement are several separate, yet intimately
related, criticisms of M'Naghten. The test is medically unsound by
overvaluation of the intellectual factor. Modern psychology views
the personality as an integrated whole. The M'Naghten test was
formulated in the days of faculty psychology, which divided the
mind into neat little autonomous compartments. A defect in one
compartment was thought not to affect any other. This view has
long since been abandoned in favor of the integration of the princi-
pal functions of personality. The M'Naghten test virtually ignores
the emotions (affect) and volition.36 This tends to freeze the law
in a rigid, nondynamic mold incapable of adjusting to advances
in psychological theory.
37
The word wrong as used in the test is ambiguous. Does it mean
legal wrong, or moral wrong? Not many cases actually discuss the
33 M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark and Fin. 200, 209, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
34 "In all such cases the controlling question is the sanity or insanity of the accused with respect
to the act, and upon trial of this issue there is, in legal contemplation, no middle ground, the
defendant is either sane or insane .... . . Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 429, 153 Pac. 756, 758
(1915).
35 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-53, Report, Cmd., No. 8932 at 80 (1953).
36 "The M'Naghten rule has no medical or scientific application except as noted for the infre-
quent case of disturbed consciousness which is mere coincidence." Roche, The Criminal Mind 102
(Evergreen ed. 1959). Dr. Roche also points out that, "The determination of capacity for knowledge
in one accused of crime is neither science nor art . . . . lIIt is a moral inquiry between the accused
and a psychiatrist .... . .. Id. at 111.
The proponents of M'Naghten will concede the validity of the "integration of persanolity"
thesis. See Cavanagh, Problems of a Psychiatrist in Operating Under the M'Naghten, Durham and
Model Penal Code Rules, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 478 (1962). Dr. Cavanagh, however, believes that in-
telligence and ethical values are more easily measured than affect, imagination or will.
Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 521 (2d ed. 1960). See Biggs, The Guilty Mind (1955)
for an excellent historical background.
37Mr. Justice Frankfurter, before the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment stated in port-
"The M'Naghten Rules were rules which the Judges, in response to questions by the House of Lords,
formulated in the light of the then existing psychological knowledge .... I do not see why the
rules of low should be arrested at the state of psychological knowledge of the time when they
were formulated .... " Quoted by Judge Biggs in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 765
(3d Cir. 1961).
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point.38 Most courts use the word wrong without defining it. A
few courts hold it to mean moral wrong; a larger number of cases
decide it means legal and moral wrong; still others confine it to
legal wrong. 9 To understate the matter, the definitional problem
is in a state of hopeless confusion.
It is difficult to be certain how Colorado views the word wrong.
The DeRinzie case involved an instruction which defined insanity in
a general way (apparently "right from wrong") and also stated:
That if the defendant was incapable of understanding, at
the time the act was committed, that it was wrong, and that
it was a violation of the law of God and society, he should
be acquitted.
40
The defendant complained that his trial for burglary and larceny
was for a violation of a law of Colorado and no other law. The
opinion, which reads more like a sermon, upheld the charge since
"it was only equivalent to saying that if his poor mind could not
understand that he was committing a wrong he should be allowed
to go. . ... "41
The court, inferentially, found no difference between "the divine
injunction thou shalt not steal" and the criminal code. Does this
place Colorado among the jurisdictions holding wrong to mean
legal and moral wrong? The answer is certainly not clear and
perhaps not very important. The Colorado statute directs the court
to instruct the jury in terms of the statute.42 Thus the DeRinzie
situation is unlikely to reoccur. The problem could arise where a
person knew the act was a crime and would subject him to punish-
ment but he committed it because he was under a delusion that he
was divinely commanded to save society by sacrificing his own life.
This person is responsible if wrong is confined to legal wrong and
irresponsible if it is confined to moral wrong.
43
Colorado's early acknowledgement of irresistible impulse as a
defense deflects some of the criticism directed to the M'Naghten
Rules. The defense takes volition into account. However, as Judge
Bazelon points out in Durham, it is also inadequate "in that it gives
no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and
reflection and so relegates acts caused by such illness to the applica-
tion of the inadequate right-wrong test.
'44
Even if it be conceded that the addition of irresistible impulse
adds the concept of volition to cognition, the emotions are still
neglected. But the simple expedient of adding another symptom
to the legal test should not satisfy the thoughtful critic. The funda-
mental objection is not that criminal irresponsibility is made to
rest upon an inadequate, invalid or indeterminable symptom or
38 People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915) is one of the few. Judge, later Justice,
Cardozo concluded it meant moral wrong.
Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 13, at 77 states "The Opinion of the Judge [sic] is so confusing
on this point it seems impossible to determine in what sense the word 'wrong' was there used."
39 See Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 13, at 78-79 for numerous citations.
40 De Rinzie v. People, 56 Colo. 249, 250, 138 Pac. 1009 (1914).
41'id. at 250-51, 138 Pac. at 1010.
42 See note 15 supra.
43 Moral knowledge could be further refined to a "'right knowledge" of moral precepts. This
would render the situation even more hopeless. In London Guarantee & Acc. Co. v. Officer, 78 Colo.
441, 446, 242 Pac. 989, 991 (1926), the court said: " ]evertheless he may not be held accountable
if affected with a mental derangement which precludes any conception of the moral and legal
aspects of the killing .... " This was a civil action and the above quotation would be merely
dictum in a criminal case.
44 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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manifestation, but that it is made to rest upon any particular
symptom.
45
Our fundamental question remains. Do the M'Naghten Rules, as
supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, aid decision-makers
in identifying those who are so mentally disordered that they ought
not be responsible to the ordinary criminal processes?
The criminal law provides the state with an imposing arsenal
of official sanctions. The state can deprive a criminal of liberty,
life, property and respect. The unofficial sanctions which accompany
a designation of criminal or ex-convict may be more devastating
than the official sanctions. The moral condemnation which is an
integral part of the designation "criminal" places a stigma on a
person which may alter his relations with the community for all
time.
Calling attention to these possibilities should silence those who
maintain that an automatic commitment to a mental hospital as
insane (irresponsible) is difficult to distinguish from a prison
sentence as sane (responsible).
The inescapable fact is that our mental institutions contain
many patients who suffer from serious mental illness and who
know the difference between right and wrong.46 It would be im-
possible to have order and control in a mental institution if the
patients did not know and follow some minimal rules of conduct.
How can one determine whether the accused has knowledge of
right and wrong? Dr. Roche states that the only direct way is to
put the question to him. He points out that many psychotics have
a hypertrophied sense of right and wrong which characterizes their
illness. So, if a mentally-ill accused answers hypotheticals indicating
he knows right from wrong, or states that his own crime was wrong,
he invites his own undoing.4 7 The only warranted conclusion, how-
ever, is that the accused can, or cannot, know right from wrong
on a verbal level. This is not a clinical reality.
Whether viewed as an unsophisticated attempt to define psy-
chotic, or isolate non-deterrables, our current rules fail of their
purpose. Mental illness per se need not be synonymous with in-
sanity to satisfy the law's manipulative purposes. Surely serious
mental illness, e.g., serious enough to require involuntary commit-
ment in a mental hospital, should be sufficient to result in a finding
of criminal irresponsibility. Since Colorado, along with most states,
automatically commits an insane defendant, the issue is not total
freedom vs. incarceration. 4s It is manipulation into a punitive, non-
rehabilitative setting vs. manipulation into a nonpunitive, rehabili-
tative setting.
In stressing the cognitive and part of the volitional aspects of
personality, over one hundred years of psychological advancement
is in large measure excluded.49 Persons suffering from serious
45 Id. at 872.
46 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 765 (3d Cir. 1961).
47 Roche, The Criminal Mind 109 (Evergreen ed. 1959).
48 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-4(2) (Supp. 1960). "If the verdict is that the defendant was insane
at the time the alleged offense was committed the judge shall forthwith commit him to the State
Hospital at Pueblo .... "
49 Judge Biggs points out that the substance of the M'Naghten Rules is not 119 years old but
375 years old. The right and wrong test is set out in a book by William Lombard of Lincolns Inn,
Eirnarcha, 1582. See United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 764 (3d Cir. 1961).
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mental illness may not come within the operation of the rules. 5°
The verbal formulation of the tests suffers from ambiguities and
leaves the trier hopelessly uninformed.51 By stating the test of legal
responsibility in terms of any symptom-and impaired intellect
and volition are inadequate symptoms alone-the law rejects the
universally accepted theory of the integration of personality.
Some commentators cite Colorado courts as being very liberal
with the psychiatrist in allowing him to communicate the total
psychological picture of the accused to the jury. This is said to avoid
some of the rigors of M'Naghten. To a similar contention Mr. Justice
Frankfurter said, "I think the M'Naghten Rules are very difficult
for conscientious people and not difficult enough for people who
say, 'We'll just juggle them'....-52
Colorado, Denver in particular, has recently been the focus
of a great deal of public debate concerning the defense of insanity.
The newspapers have given widespread coverage to several dra-
matic cases and initiated a "campaign" to correct defects in the law.
When the sensational aspects of the reporting are trimmed away,
the complaint would seem to be that the plea is entered and success-
ful too often.
53
One of the most thoughtful public statements came from a
woman juror who served on a case where the accused was found
not guilty by reason of insanity. She decried the lack of dignity
in the proceedings, the communication barriers and the jury's
inability to reach a rational decision. 54 This is to be contrasted with
a typically facile statement that this is, "one of the major problems
facing our society. '55 Obviously, we have a problem. What are the
true dimensions of the problem? How can we reach a rational
solution?
A recent unpublished study casts some new light on part of
Colorado's problem in this area. This study covered all the criminal
indictments and informations for murder, burglary, larceny, forgery
and rape filed in the District Criminal Court (Divisions 8, 9, and 10)
for the City and County of Denver, for the years 1957 through
1961.56 Statistics were collected to indicate the number of charges,
the number of insanity pleas entered, how often the plea was
withdrawn prior to trial, the frequency of insanity being sub-
mitted to the jury and the frequency of success.
50 Several Denver psychiatrists recently stated that not more than one in a hundred patients at
the State Hospital in Pueblo could meet the right and wrong test. Unreported testimony given in a
hearing in the Denver District Court before Judge Neil Horan, People v. French (1962).
51 The problem of expert and non-exeprt testimony is taken up at p. 347 infra.
52 Testimony before The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, quoted in United States v.
Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 766 (3d Cir. 1961).
53 Denver Post, Aug. 5, 1962, §AA, p. 1, cal. 1. The article refers to the cases of Daniel Lee
French, Alfred Ratzloff, Joseph Scheer, Raymond Patton and others.
54 Rocky Mountain News, June 14, 1962, p. 47, col. 4. This appears in a column by Pasquale
Marranzino who is to be commended for his reporting of this problem. The case involved Daniel
Lee French who was accused of raping several Denver women. This writer served as co-counsel
for French with Walter L. Gerash of the Denver Bar.
55 This phraseology is perhaps suitable in a political campaign but is obviously of no utility
in formulating the issues.
56Smeltzer, Insanity as a Defense in Murder and Lesser Crimes (1962). Unpublished manuscript
on file at the University of Denver, College of Law Library. The writer is indebted to George
Smeltzer, student at the University of Denver, College of Low, for his efforts and permission to
use these figures. The actual data were compiled from the Docket Fee Book and Register, book
numbers: 71 through 83. The figures are based on the number of indictments or informations and
not the number of actual cases. For example, a single case may involve several defendants and
several counts of larceny and larceny by bailee. This was counted as a single case of larcency. The
study was completed Sept. 1, 1962.
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The murder figures for the five year period indicate 121 charges,
41 insanity pleas, 14 withdrawals prior to trial, 27 cases of sub-
mission of the plea to the jury and 21 findings of insanity and
commitment to the hospital. This means that approximately 78%
of the cases reaching the jury result in a finding of insanity.
The withdrawals of the plea probably are largely determined by
the results of the automatic commitment and observation aspect
of the Colorado statute.57 In addition, if an accused is not financially
able to hire his own psychiatrists or hires psychiatrists who believe
him to be sane, he is likely to withdraw the plea. Thus, as startling
as the jury success figures appear, they must be modified by these
factors which do not appear as part of the statistical study.
In relation to the number of charges filed, the plea was success-
ful about 17% of the time. The plea was entered in about 34% of
the cases although, as noted, frequently withdrawn.
Most commentators assume that the plea of insanity is almost
exclusively confined to homicide cases.5 8 This study tends to bear
out the statement. The plea was entered about 34% of the time in
murder cases and this far surpassed the other crimes studied.59
Almost every case reaching the Supreme Court of Colorado, since
1915, involving a point about insanity was a murder case, and
usually first-degree murder.
In relation to the number of charges filed, the insanity plea has
been successful in 2.8% of the rape cases; larceny, 1.1%; burglary,
1.9%; and forgery, 1.4.% In every category there was a 50% chance
or better of an insanity verdict if the case went to the jury.° °
These figures would seem to completely invalidate the charges
concerning the frequency and success of the plea.6 1 Trial attorneys
should not hastily conclude that they have an excellent chance
of getting a verdict of insanity if they go to the jury. It is almost
certain that success at that stage is, in large measure, related to
available psychiatric opinion. To discredit the newspaper attack
on the law is not also to state that the law is satisfactory. In fact,
the relative infrequency of success lends credence to the thesis
that the existing rules are not an effective aid in identifying the
person with serious mental illness.
B. The Commitment-Treatment Decision
From a legal perspective, a finding of "not guilty by reason of
insanity" means that the accused was and is not responsible for
the conduct in question. Unlike any other successful defense to a
criminal charge, a verdict of insanity will still subject the person
to involuntary confinement.
The Colorado statute provides that the defendant shall be
forthwith committed to the State Hospital at Pueblo.62 Although
the point never seems to have been articulated in Colorado, a
verdict of insanity at the time of the commission of the act must
57Co1. Rev. Stat. 139-8-2 (Supp. 1961). Subsections (1) and (4) amended by Colo. Sess. Laws
1962, ch. 45, 11.
58 See, e.g.. Roche, The Criminal Mind 91 (Evergreen ed. 1959).
59 In relation to the total number of charges, the insanity plea was entered in 7.3% of the
rope cases, 5.4% of the larceny cases, 6.8% of the burglary cases and 10.7% of the forgery cases.
60 100% for rape (4 cases in the 5 year period). 78% for burglary (23 cases). 88% for larceny
(15 cases). 50% for forgery (5 cases).
61 The entire compilation of statistics from this study appears in the appendix.
62 Colo. Rev. Stat. 139-8-4(2) (Supp. 1960).
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carry with it a presumption that the insanity continues. If it did
not, the accused would seem to be entitled to a hearing on his
present sanity.63 There would be grave constitutional questions
posed in institutionalizing, without a hearing, a now sane person
who has been found criminally irresponsible.
In twenty-nine jurisdictions it is mandatory that hospitalization
follow such acquittal. In twenty states hospitalization is discretion-
ary, and three provide for a special procedure.
6 4
It is entirely proper that a person who has committed a serious
antisocial act, for which he is not criminally responsible, should be
required to submit to custody, care and treatment. Sophisticated
legal reasoning need not obscure the social fact of manifested
danger to the community. The commission of socially harmful acts,
regardless of mental condition, is a sufficient basis for confinement
and treatment. Confinement without the availability and use of
medical treatment, however, would be a perversion of the entire
insanity defense.
Daniel Lee French was recently found not guilty of rape by
reason of insanity. Denver District Judge Neil Horan requested
the Governor to transfer him to the State Penitentiary "for security
reasons."6 5 The Governor complied with the request. Conceding
the executive power to do this, one is still at a loss to explain the
seemingly superfluous separate sanity trial. The availability of
psychiatric help is extremely limited at the penitentiary. A verdict
of irresponsibility is turned into prison confinement on the sug-
gestion of a judge and the power of an executive order.66
The Supreme Court of Colorado has held that, "One who is
insane when he commits an act prohibited by law cannot be held
guilty of a crime. A statute providing that insanity shall be no de-
fense to a criminal charge would be unconstitutional. 6 7 If some of
the punitive aspects of criminal responsibility can be invoked on the
ex parte decision of elected officials, the constitutional protection
is little more than a slogan.
C. The Criminal Process Delay Decision
1. THE TESTS
a. Trial--The mental condition of an accused will result in
criminal irresponsibility only if he was insane at the time of the com-
mission of the act. Mental condition, however, is legally relevant for
other decisions at four other time periods: (1) before or at trial, (2)
sentencing, (3) execution of the death sentence, and (4) appeal.
The Colorado statute, in accordance with the common law rule,
will not require an accused to stand trial if he is presently insane.68
63 In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897).
64 The Mentally Disabled and the Law, Table XI-A, at 373-82 (Iindman & McIntyre ed. 1961)
provides a reference to the procedure in all the states. The figures quoted are from this source.
65 Rocky Mountain News, June 8, 1962, p. 10, col. 1.
66 The French case has other aspects which are difficult to grasp. The district attorney decided
to prosecute the accused for a rape which occurred shortly before the rape at issue in the sanity
trial. Apparently the prosecutor's office believes it has the power to continue going back in time,
when a series of crimes are involved, and force the defendant into successive sanity trials. The
presumption of continuing insanity would seem to preclude trial until the defendant has recovered. If
this procedure is upheld, the constitutionality of the automatic commitment procedure becomes a very
urgent question.
67 Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 522, 22 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1933).
68 Colo. Rev. Stat. 139-8-6(1) (1953). "A person charged with the commission of a felony or a
misdemeanor who becomes insane after such commission shall not be tried for the offense while
his insanity continues .... ..
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The statutory language seems broad enough to not require an
accused to plead to an indictment or information if presently insane.
Several policy goals of the criminal law are furthered by requir-
ing some minimal mental competence at the time of trial. The
accused must be able to rationally assist counsel in the preparation
and defense of his case. He should be able to comprehend the
nature of the proceedings in order to play an intelligent part in
this public drama involving the conflict between "good and evil."'
Notions of humanitarianism dictate that we avoid the public spec-
tacle of fixing guilt on a bewildered, disorganized defendant. We
require him to be as mentally alert as his natural endowments
permit in order to compete on equal terms with his accusers.
The test for determining sanity at the time of trial is:
. . .The defendant is not to be considered as insane if he
has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature and object
of the proceeding against him and to rightly comprehend his
own condition with reference to such proceeding ... and has
sufficient mind to conduct his defense in a rational and
reasonable manner, although on some other subjects his
mind may be deranged or unsound.
70
Contrary to the tests for criminal irresponsibility, every state,
except Washington which applies the common law, appears to legis-
latively define the test for delay of the criminal process.
In thirty-four jurisdictions the state of mind required is that of
insanity.71 In some of these states insanity is equated with the test
for criminal irresponsibility, while in others, as in Colorado, insanity
is descriptive of alternative mental conditions.7  Seventeen states
use the term "mentally defective" or its equivalent in the statutory
definition.
73
The Colorado test indicates a legislative awareness of the dif-
ferent role that mental condition plays throughout the criminal
process. It is directed to an inquiry almost solely related to the
cognitive aspect of the personality. The criticisms directed to the
"right and wrong" formulation as a test for criminal irresponsibility
are not as relevent here. The defendant, and society, have good
reason to require an expeditious decision. If proper changes are
made in disposing of the responsibility question, the medical and
semantical problems at this point will vanish.
b. Sentence-If the accused becomes insane after a verdict of
guilty but before sentence is pronounced the judge must delay im-
position of sentence. This was the rule at common law and, with
variations, is still universally accepted.
7 4
The time between verdict and sentence is most important.
Matters are being considered which may weigh heavily in the
court's sentence. Since American jurisprudence rarely makes pro-
vision for sentence review, it is imperative that the accused have
69 Roche, The Criminal Mind 67 (Evergreen ed. 1959).
70 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-6(8) (1953).
71 The Mentally Disabled and the Law, Table XI-B, at 386-94 (Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961).
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Weihofen, Mental Disorder As A Criminal Defense 459 (1954).
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an opportunity to intelligently and rationally assist in the presenta-
tion of data to the court.
75
In Colorado, the defendant has a right to make a statement in
his own behalf and to present information in mitigation of punish-
ment.76 The same is true in the federal jurisdiction.77 The usual
safeguards surrounding a trial are not constitutionally required
after a verdict of guilty. There is no right of confrontation or cross-
examination, and hearsay rules are unavailing. 7 This makes it very
important that the defendant be able to explain some of the items
offered against him and assist in presenting mitigating evidence.
The Colorado statute reads:
.. .The defendant is not to be considered as insane if he
has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the
proceeding against him, the charge of which he has been
convicted, and the nature and extent of the possible punish-
ment that may be administered to him, and has sufficient
mind to know of any facts which might tend to mitigate his
offense and to communicate such facts to his atttorney or to
the court.
79
Colorado, with most jurisdictions, requires that the defendant
be able to appreciate the potential punishment. The underlying
reason is probably a belief that the deterrent value of punishment
is minimized unless there is an appreciation of its nature. This
represents a rather naive understanding of the psychological varia-
tions present in humans."0 A complete psychological abstract of the
defendant would have to be available before a judge would be
certain of the deterrent value of any sentence.
c. Execution-In an exquisite display of compassion, the law will
not permit an insane person to be executed. Thurmond Arnold uses
this legal curiosity to illustrate "how conflicting rational and moral
principles condition the behavior of civilized institutions, just as
taboos condition the behavior of savage institutions."''
Whereas many authorities believe that constitutional protection
surrounds the right not to be tried or sentenced while insane,
delay of execution is held to be a matter of grace and not of right.8 2
If suspension of execution is a matter of grace, then the condemned
man has no argument about the procedural implementation of the
rule.s
3
The common law made no provision for delaying execution of
sentence because of insanity when the punishment was less than
death. 4 This is the contemporary view and most jurisdictions will
simply transfer a mentally ill person from a penal to a mental
institution. The principle reason for the rule appears to be that
75 United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. III. 1960). Connecticut has a sentence review
division of the Superior Court.
76 Colo. R. Crim. P. 32(b). See Symposium, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev, (1961).
77 Fed. R. Crim. P. 
3 2
(a).
78 See: e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 LEd. 1337 (1949).
79 Colo. Rev. Stat §39-9.6(8) (1953).
80 See Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378
(1952).
81 Arnold, The Symbols of Government 10-13 (1935). Arnold relates the story of the condemned
prisoner who attempted suicide and was kept alive until the execution by blood transfusions. The
blood was donated by the prison guards!
82 The Mentally Disabled and the Law, op. cit. supro note 64, at 357-58 for numerous citations.
83 Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 18 S.Ct. 87, 42 LEd. 515 (1897); Solesbee v. Bolkcom, 339
U.S. 9, 70 S.Ct. 457, 94 L.Ed. 604 (1950); Berger v. People, 123 Colo. 403, 231 P.2d 799 (1951).
84 Weihofen, Mental Disorder As A Criminal Defense 464-65 (1954).
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society is not served by executing an insane man. Further, the
condemned man must be able to appreciate the reasons why the
state is taking his life.
Whether society is ever served by capital punishment is question-
able. Debate on that question is beyond the scope of this article.
The illogic of finding a condemned man insane, subjecting him to
extensive and expensive psychiatric care so that he goes into the
gas chamber with the ability to appreciate seems clear.
8 5
The Colorado statute provides that:
... The defendant is not to be considered as insane if he has
sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the pro-
ceeding against him, the charge of which he was convicted,
the purpose of his punishment, and the impending fate which
awaits him, and has sufficient mind to know of any facts
which would make his punishment unlawful and to com-
municate such facts to his attorney or to the court. 8
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court has said,
"Is it not an inverted humanitarianism that deplores as barbarous
the capital punishment of those who have become insane after
trial and conviction, but accepts the capital punishment of sane
men. 817 The overriding consideration of disutility in executing
anyone tends to make a horrible joke out of the consideration shown
the mentally ill.
8 8
d. Appeal-There is no provision in the Colorado statute, and no
case appears to have arisen, concerning delay of an appeal pending
restoration of sanity. Some few jurisdictions feel that meritorious
grounds for appeal may be lost if the defendant cannot intelligently
assist counsel.8 9
The defendant has a minimal role to play in perfecting, briefing
and arguing an appeal. Unless questions of fact are involved he
need not even be consulted since the grounds are probably the
sole result of the attorney's appraisal of the case 0 Under our
present system, delay in making an appeal may be positively
harmful to the defendant. A clearly unjustified conviction should
be corrected at the earliest moment.91
2. PROCEDURE
a. Raising the question-The Colorado statute is somewhat
vague on just how, and by whom, an allegation of present insanity
may be made. The statute states that:
[T] he judge of the court in which the criminal charge against
such defendant is or has been pending, if he believes the
defendant is insane or has a reasonable doubt thereto, of his
own motion may impanel a jury to determine by its verdict
85 See Duffy and Jennings, The San Quentin Story 80-82 (1950). Weihofen, A Question of Justice-
Trial or Execution of an Insane Defendant, 37 A.B.A.J. 651, 652 (1951).
86 Colo. Rev. Stat. 139-8-6(8) (1953).
87 Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 144, 159, 208 P.2d 668, 676-77 (1949). (Concurring opinian.)
88 The suggestion that new reasons or evidence might be forthcoming, as a basis tor the rule,
is unconvincing. Trial and appeals were had and counsel can convey factors which might influence
a pardon. See Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law 434 (1952).
89 Williams v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. App. 585, 124 S.W.2d 990 (1938); People v. Skwirsky, 213
N.Y. 151, 107 N.E. 47 (1914).
90 The grounds for appeal may be only too well known to the lawyer if he Is responsible for an
inartistic trial.
91 See Note, Appellate Proceedings Stayed During Insanity of Accused, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 133
(1956).
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whether such defendant has thus become and then is insane.
[S] uch allegation is made in a verified petition filed in the
court where the criminal charge is or has been pending,
supported by the affidavit of a physician who is a specialist
in mental diseases, stating as his opinion that the defendant
has thus become and is insane.92 (Emphasis added.)
It is clear that the judge may raise the issue on his own motion
and the defendant, or counsel, may do so by verified petition sup-
ported by a psychiatrist's affidavit. In the unlikely situation of the
district attorney's wishing to urge the defendant's present insanity,
the court would, no doubt, be persuaded to make this its own
motion.
The common law procedure requires no special plea or formality
and can be made orally, by affidavit or in any form sufficient to
raise a doubt.9 3 The question could be raised not only by the court,
defendant or his counsel, but by any person.94 The question in
Colorado would be whether any interested party could present a
properly supported verified affidavit. The question seems never to
have come up.
The majority of the states have retained the substance of the
common law rule.95 Ohio is the only other state which requires
the physician's affidavit.96
b. Hearing-When the issue of present insanity arises, many
states distinguish the type of hearing available according to the time
the insanity allegedly emerged. Pre-conviction and post-conviction
insanity is handled in much the same fashion in Colorado.
If a verified petition and psychiatrist's affidavit are properly
filed in the court where the criminal charge is, or has been pending:
[T] he judge of the court may make such investigation as to
the condition of the defendant's mind as in his discretion he
deems advisable. If after such investigation the judge believes
that the defendant has thus become and then is insane, or has
a reasonable doubt thereto, with all convenient speed, he
must inpanel a jury to determine by its verdict whether the
defendant has thus become and then is insane.97 (Emphasis
added).
Thus, in Colorado, the ultimate decision whether a defendant
has a hearing on the issue of present sanity rests with the trial
judge. The defendant is given a statutory procedure for raising the
question but this is obviously not a hearing on the merits. There is
no provision for the presentation of evidence to the judge, without
a jury, for the purpose of showing present insanity. The court is
empowered to make an investigation, and this could include hear-
ing defendant's evidence, but only to decide whether cause exists
to impanel a jury.
97 a
No Colorado case has been found which deals with a possible
abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to impanel a jury
92 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-86(3),(4) (1953.
93 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Defense 440-41 (1954).
94 Id. at 441.
95 Then Mentally Disabled and the Law, op. cit. supra note 64, at 360.
96 Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. 12945.35 (Baldwin 1958).
97 Colo. Rev. Stat. 139-8-6(4) (1953).
97a Evidence is not inadmissible at such a hearing solely because it antedates the entry of Judg-
ment and sentence. See Garrisan v. People, 15 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. sh. 160 (1963).-
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on the issue of incompetency before trial, or after conviction and
prior to sentencing. All the major cases in this area deal with
insanity prior to execution of the death sentence. Other jurisdic-
tions have been reluctant to find an abuse of discretion and reversals
are rare.98
It may come as a surprise that there is apparently no constitu-
tional right to a hearing; that a defendant may be precluded
from being heard, presenting witnesses and cross-examining the
court-appointed psychiatrist.99 Three reasons are offered for this
position: (1) This is merely a continuation of the common law
rule, (2) The plea of present insanity does not affect guilt or inno-
cence, and (3) An appellate court is available to order a hearing
in the event that defendant made a proper showing in the trial
court.100
If the reasons for not trying or sentencing a mentally ill de-
fendant are valid, then a more satisfactory method for deciding
that issue must be devised.
Defendants are probably reluctant to plead insanity in order to
delay trial or sentencing. If they are mentally disturbed at, or near,
the time of trial the effort will be made to escape criminal responsi-
bility. A very different matter is at issue when the defendant
seeks to avoid the death penalty.
The earlier disputes concerning the right to a jury on the issue
of insanity at the time of execution of the death penalty have been
positively resolved by statute.101 As in the other cases of present
insanity, the trial judge must entertain a "reasonable doubt" before
he is required to impanel a jury. The statute which formerly
governed this area stated: "In all . . . [cases of present insanity]
it shall be the duty of the court to impanel a jury to try the question
whether the accused be at the time of impaneling insane or luna-
tic.",'
0 2
In Bulgar v. People,10 3 although the point was not directly
before the court, it was indicated that since the statute did not
state the manner in which insanity should be ascertained at the
outset, the common law should apply. This, of course, meant that
the decision to impanel a jury was in the absolute discretion of the
trial court. The earlier statute could, and probably should, have
been interpreted as changing the common law.1°4 All the cases
following Bulgar are in accord with the dictum. 105
Colorado follows the common law in holding that only the court
where the trial was held has jurisdiction to make inquiry into the
present mental condition of a condemned defendant.10 6 The de-
fendant remains in the technical custody of such court which has
98 See Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 93, at 444-45, 447.
99 See State v. Neu, 180 La. 545, 550-51, 157 So. 105, 106 (1934). But cf. Higgins v. United
States, 205 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 870, 74 S.Ct. 134, 98 L. Ed. 379 (1954).
100 While this question has received little attention, see Weihofen, op. cit supra note 93, at 446.
State v. Neu, supra note 99.
101 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-6(4) (1953).
102 Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 48, §7 (1935).
103 61 Colo. 187, 193, 156 Pac. 800, 804 (1916).
104 Berger v. People, 123 Colo. 403, 417, 231 P.2d 799, 806 (1951). (Holland, J., dissenting.)
105 Shank v. People, 79 Colo. 576, 247 Pac. 559 (1926); People ex rel. Best v. Eldred, 103 Colo.
334, 86 P.2d 248 (1938); Berger v. People, 123 Colo. 403, 231 P.2d 799 (1951); Leick v. People, 140
Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959).
106 People ex re. Best v. Eldred, supra note 105.
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responsibility to see that the sentence is carried out. Thus, the
condemned man is denied access to other judicial remedies for a
determination of present sanity.
In addition to answering the jury trial question, Bulgar also
stated that, "We are very certain, however, that it was intended
by the common law and the statute that a collateral hearing of
this character should not be subject to review by an appellate
tribunal."" T7 The court thus precluded review by writ of error
or certiorari.
If the defendant convinces the trial judge that doubt exists
concerning his present sanity then, by statute, the trial is deemed
a civil proceeding. The jury is selected as in civil cases. The burden
is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
insanity at that time and as having occurred since the commission
of the offense, or since the verdict of guilty, or since the judg-
ment, as the case may be.
10 8
This entire statutory scheme has been held constitutional. 0 9
The court relied on decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States which characterized these proceedings as analagous to
reprieves. This power is usually vested in the executive, rarely
subject to judicial review, and therefore none of the usual safe-
guards surrounding the trial of guilt are required." 0
c. Disposition if Found Incompetent-Colorado, along with at
least thirty-nine other jurisdictions, requires mandatory hospitaliza-
tion if the defendant is found presently insane. The defendant is to
be confined in the State Hospital at Pueblo until he is no longer
insane."'
d. Recovery-In many states the certificate of the superintendent
of the hospital where the defendant is confined is sufficient to war-
fant resumption of the criminal process."' The Colorado statute,
however , treats the certificate of recovery as the first step in the
process. The certificate is sent to the trial judge who must then noti-
fy the district attorney and then with all due speed impanel a jury.
The court has no discretion as to a jury trial for this decision." 3 The
burden is upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is insane."
4
If the defendant is found sane then he is to be quickly tried,
sentenced or executed as the case may be. If he is found insane,
in spite of the hospital's opinion, he is recommitted on the same
conditions as before."
'.
1(17 Bulgar v. People, 61 Cola. 187, 198, 156 Pac. 800, 804 (1916).
16', Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-6(7) (1953).
109 Leick v. People, 140 Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959).
110 Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 18 S.Ct. 87, 42 L.Ed. 515 (1897); Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339
U.S. 9, 70 S.Ct. 457, 94 L.Ed. 604 (1950); Williams v New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93
LEd. 1337 (1949).
111 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-6(5)'(1953). The defendant, in addition to present insanity, must prove
that he has become insane since the time at issue.
The Mentally Disabled and the Low 361 (Lindmon & McIntyre ed. 1961).
I 1" Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 93, at 458.
113 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-6(5) (1953).
114 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-6(7) (1953).
115 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-6(5) (1953). The court has the power to, and must at the district attorney's
request, order the defendant committed for observation and examination under the §39-8-2 (Supp.
1961) procedure in case of any of these hearings.
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III. PROCEDURAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IRRESPONSIBILITY DECISION
A. Raising the Defense
In Colorado, and at least nine other states, the defense of in-
sanity must be specially pleaded." 0 The defense must be pleaded
orally at the arraignment in the form, "Not guilty by reason of in-
sanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. '117 The
court may, for good cause shown, permit the plea to be entered any
time prior to the trial.
Failure to raise the defense at the proper time and in the proper
form will result in the unavailability of insanity as a defense. Be-
fore 1927, the defendant could raise the question by a general plea
of not guilty. The present procedure is said to have preserved the
defendant's constitutional right to the defense and his right to a
jury trial. i8 The statute is viewed as having affected a procedural
change only.
There is no question about the propriety of requiring a special
plea. In view of the technical nature of the proof involved, the
prosecutor has a legitimate right to have adequate notice. So long
as our present framework exists, the reason for the rule is clear and
if the rule is not rigidly applied, it serves a useful purpose. Colo-
rado's special plea requirement seems preferable to allowing the
plea initially at the trial or allowing it under a general plea of not
guilty.119 This procedure would be harmonious with the suggestion
that there should be a liberal pre-trial exchange of data and psy-
chiatric evaluations.
B. Trial
The Colorado Legislature and Supreme Court have experienced
grave difficulties in deciding whether the insanity issue must, or
should, be tried separately. There have been at least four major
changes on this point since 1927. The net result is that the present
law is essentially the same as it was in 1927. If the defendant pleads
the defense of insanity, and joins with it other pleas not involving
insanity, the trial judge has the discretion to try the insanity issue
alone or hold one trial upon all issues raised.
120
In Ingles121 the court commented on the constitutionality of the
trial court's discretion in granting separate trials. Explicitly noting
that it was not deciding the question, the court said any possible
problem would be obviated by bearing all defenses in a single
trial.12 2 In Wymer 123 the defendant complained that it was error
to deny him a separate trial on the insanity question since he was
compelled to submit to observation and examination upon pleading
insanity. The court cited Ingles as dispositive of the question.'1 4
116 Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 357 (1954).
Fourteen jurisdictions provide for prior notice of intent to rely on an alibi defense.
117 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-1 (Supp. 1960). Colo. R. Crim. P. 11(b). See 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 20
(1961).
118 Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 522-23, 22 P.2d 1109, 1111 (1933).
119 A plea of insanity may not be entered by the court on its own motion. See Mundy v. People,
105 Colo. 547, 100 P.2d 584 (1940); Boyd v. People, 108 Colo. 289, 116 P.2d 193 (1941). But see
Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
120 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-3(1) (Supp. 1960).
121 Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).
122 Id. at 530, 22 P.2d at 1114.
123 Wymer v. People, 114 Colo. 43, 160 P.2d 987 (1945).
124 Id. at 49; 160 P.2d at 990.
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It is true that Ingles upheld the commitment and examination
aspect of the statute but, as noted previously, it did not decide the
single trial issue. Nevertheless, the court upheld the procedure,
feebly adding that to hold otherwise would mean every conviction
of crime involving an insanity defense prior to 1927 was unconsti-
tutional.
125
The legislative experiment in 1951 required that the defendant
be first tried on the substantive offense if he entered pleas not
limited to insanity.126 Defendant was conclusively presumed to be
sane at the first trial and he might, in the discretion of the court,
be tried by the same jury.
127
Having "decided" that the trial court was properly vested with
discretion to have separate trials or one trial on all issues, the ques-
tion remained whether the judge could properly order a single trial
first on the issues raised by defenses other than insanity. The
Martin case came as close as any to providing an answer.128 The
trial judge set the trial on the substantive crime first but without
ordering commitment and observation of the defendant. This was
held to be error since "the commitment must follow immediately
after the entry of the plea. '129 The court went on to volunteer that,
"While we have considerable doubt as to whether an accused
person can be compelled by statute to first stand trial upon
the issues framed by a plea of not guilty, and compel with-
holding of determination of his mental responsibility until
after a verdict has been rendered on the not guilty plea, we
are not called upon to determine." [sic].13°
In 1955, the legislature reacted to the court's doubts by giving
the defendant the right to demand a separate trial on the insanity
issue before being tried on any other defense.131 At the same time
the troublesome portions of the statute dealing with the conclusive
presumption of sanity and trial of both issues before the same jury
were omitted. The Leick1 32 case made it clear that the plea of in-
sanity is an admission of the offense charged but only for the pur-
poses of the plea.
The supreme court has made it abundantly clear that separate
trials are but sections of a single trial. Thus the trial court is not
required to enter a judgment of sanity when the first trial is con-
cluded so that the defendant may appeal. 133
Conducting a separate trial first on the sanity issue seems sensi-
ble. The testimony on sanity is often technical and difficult to fol-
low. A much wider area of conduct is disclosed at such a trial and
this is bound to confuse and prejudice the jury if it is also to decide
guilt.134 In the framework of our existing system, the separate trial
with wide evidentiary latitude is of real merit.
125 Ibid. See Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P.2d 810 (1951).
126 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-3 (Supp. 1960).
127 Ibid.
128 Martin v. District Court, 129 Colo. 27, 272 P.2d 648 (1954).
129 Id. at 29, 272 P.2d at 650.
130 Id. at 30, 272 P.2d at 650.
131 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-3 (Supp. 1960).
132 Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674 (1958).
133 Ibid.
134 See Trujillo v. People, 372 P.2d 86 (Colo. 1962).
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C. Burden of Proof
Who has the burden of convincing the triers on sanity or in-
sanity? Must the state first show that the defendant is sane or must
the defendant offer proof of insanity?
All the states agree that every man is presumed sane until the
contrary is demonstrated.13 5 Thus the initial burden of going for-
ward with some minimum amount of evidence of mental disorder
rests with the defendant.13 6 The first troublesome point in this pro-
cess is deciding how much, and what kind of evidence will dis-
charge this duty.
Nearly all the states agree that evidence sufficient to raise a
doubt concerning defendant's responsibility must be produced.
137
Colorado has not definitely resolved this problem. Some cases
speak in terms of "evidence tending to show insanity, ' 138 while
others use the less exacting "some evidence" phraseology. 139 The
District of Columbia has long adhered to the "some evidence" rule
and explains that defendant's obligation is met if he produces a
"scintilla" of evidence. 140 Without being certain of the exact stand-
ard Colorado applies, it is safe to assume that the burden on de-
fendants is minimal. Defense counsel's strategy often includes
coming forward with a bare suggestion of mental disorder. The
major defense evidence will be presented, in rebuttal, after the
People present their case-in-chief.
After the judge is satisfied that there is a jury question, the
problem remains as to who bears the "risk of non-persuasion," or
less accurately, the "burden of proof." There are three major ap-
proaches to this problem.
The federal jurisdiction and about half the states, including
Colorado,141 require the state to establish responsibility beyond a
reasonable doubt.142 The remaining jurisdictions impose a duty on
the defendant to establish irresponsibility, but only by the civil
standard of a preponderance of the evidence. 143 Oregon formerly
required the defendant to prove his irresponsibility beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. This was held not to be a violation of the "due process
clause" in Leland v. Oregon. 44 Oregon, however, has amended its
statute to simply require of the defendant proof by a preponderance
of the evidence.
1 45
The proper form of verdict to be submitted to the jury is a
problem which continues to plague Colorado courts. The 1927
statute required that when the defendant pleaded insanity, "the
jury shall be given a form with the words 'not guilty by reason of
135 Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417, 36 Pac. 218 (1894). The presumption of sanity applies in civil
and criminal actions. North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Cavoleri, 98 Colo. 565, 58 P.2d 756 (1936);
Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256 (1946).
136 Weihofen states that there is virtual unanimity among the states in imposing the burden of
going forward on the defendant. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 227 (1954).
137 Id. at 227.
138 Graham v. People, 95 Cola. 544, 546, 38 P.2d 87 (1934); Arridy v. People, 103 Colo. 29, 33,
82 P.2d 757, 759 (1938).
139 Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 56, 6 P.2d 455, 457 (1931).
140 See In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.C.D.C. 1957); Goforth v. United States, 269 F.2d 778
(D.C.Cir. 1959).
141 Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441, 461, 36 Pac. 221, 228 (1894) (By implication); Pribble v.
People, 49 Colo. 210, 215, 112 Pac. 220, 222 (1910).
142 The Mentally Disabled and the Law 350 (Lindman & McIntyre ed. 1961).
143 Ibid.
144 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952).
145 Ore. Rev. Stat. §136.390 (1961).
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insanity.' "146 (Emphasis added.) In Mundy,147 questions of guilt
and sanity were tried together before the same jury. The trial court
concluded that there was no evidence of insanity and failed to give
the jury the insanity form of verdict. The court held that while
the presumption of sanity remained and the burden of proof was
unchanged, "nevertheless, under the statute the making of the
insanity plea and not the state of the evidence, call for the special
form of verdict."'148 The court went on to explain that even if the
defendant does not produce a single witness or testify himself, the
plea must be submitted to the jury. 49 This would indicate that the
entry of the plea was of sufficient weight to overcome the initial
presumption of sanity. Yet the Ingles case unequivocally stated
that "a plea that the defendant was insane is no more evidence
tending to show insanity than is an information or indictment
evidence tending to show guilt."'50
In Archina"1' the court attempted, with little success, to explain
Mundy as limited by the mandatory language in the statute and
the fact that it involved a single trial of all issues. The Archina court
was under the 1951 amendment which simply required that "the
jury shall return a verdict either that the defendant was sane ...
or that he was insane ... ,,152 Even if the statutory change was
relevant, and it seems not to be, the problem of relating the statute
to the presumption of sanity and defendant's initial burden of going
forward remains. This is particularly true since Ingles held the
plea of insanity entitled to no evidentiary weight. In 1955 the legis-
lature returned to the mandatory language of the 1927 statute. "In
a trial involving the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the
jury shall be given a form of verdict . . . either that the defendant
was sane at the time the alleged offense was committted or that
he was insane at that time."'1 53 (Emphasis added.) Thus the illogic
of Mundy remains and Archina's explanation is attenuated.
How can the trial judge be forced to submit an insanity verdict
form if he decides that there is no evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption of sanity? The statute, to make any sense, must be read
to mean that if the defendant meets the burden of going forward
then, and only then, must the statutory verdict form be submitted
to the jury.
D. Medical Examination
Upon making the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the
judge must commit the defendant to a hospital for observation and
examination by psychiatrists. 1.5 4 The period of commitment must
not exceed thirty days. 1 5 The judge also has power to appoint
impartial experts to examine the defendant during this period. 156
146 Colo. Sess. Laws 1927, ch. 90, p. 297.
147 Mundy v. People, 105 Colo. 547, 100 P.2d 584 (1940).
148 Id. at 551, 100 P.2d at 586.
149 Ibid.
150 Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 56, 6 P.2d 455, 457 (1931).
151 Archina v. People, 135 Colo. 8, 41, 307 P.2d 1083, 1100 (1957).
152 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-4 (1953).
153Colo. Rev. Stat. 139-8-4(1) (Supp. 1960).
154 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-2 (Supp. 1961). The statute specifies the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital
or the State Hospital at Pueblo. A judge of the Denver District Court recently committed a defendant






The medical examination under this statute is subject to some
specific regulations. The doctor may use confessions, admissions
or any other available evidence for questioning the defendant and
forming an opinion of his sanity.157 He may administer certain
drugs and use the polygraph to aid in forming an opinion and he
may testify to their results at the sanity trial.
158
The automatic commitment and observation procedure is re-
quired in at least twenty-three states and the District of Colum-
bia.159 It has the great merit of affording an indigent defendant
the possibility of a speedy, thorough and impartial examination.
There is a real need for current statistical data on the number of
defendants found sane and insane by the staffs of Colorado hos-
pitals. One suspects an unconscious, institutional bias toward sanity
findings.160
Early experience under the statute, as reported by Weihofen,
indicated that juries are very much persuaded by the hospital
finding.1 6 If this continues to be true then we must be clear about
where the effective decision-making power lies, appraise the con-
sequences and decide if this is to be encouraged. If the jury is a
"rubber-stamp" for the hospital report, the time and expense of
jury trials must be weighed against any sentimental value they
may have. The results of the study reported here suggest that
many defendants drop their insanity defense after an adverse
finding by the hospital staff.
The commitment procedure has withstood all constitutional
attacks. The statute was said to deprive a person of due process,
to compel one to testify against himself and to unconstitutionally
deprive a person of his liberty. The court has reasoned that a
person accused of a crime, whose sanity is in question, could be
confined at common law under conditions not as pleasant as those
currently provided. There is no compulsion to testify against
oneself since, as noted, any evidence first obtained at the examina-
tion is inadmissible on the issue of guilt. Since the legislature may
constitutionally alter the procedures, the defendant must take the
burdens with the benefits.
162
The defendant is, of course, free to engage such experts as he
desires and can afford.162a The district attorney may also engage
psychiatrists to examine the defendant. The statutory procedure
157 Cf. Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 60, 6 P.2d 455, 459 (1931).
158 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-2 (Supp. 1961). No substantive evidence obtained for the first time
may be offered on the issue of guilt except at a murder trial to rebut evidence of defendant's
ability to form the requisite intent.
159 The Mentally Disabled and the Law, op. cit. supra note 142, at 351.
160 Weihofen reports that 26% of the Colorado defendants committed during the first twenty-two
years of the procedure were found insane by hospital authorities. Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a
Criminal Defense 338 (1954). See Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Exam-
ination of Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 419 (1935) for an outdated but
thorough study of Colorado's experience under the statute.
161 Ibid.
162 See Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 6 P.2d 455 (1931); Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d
1109 (1933); Wymer v. People, 114 Colo. 43, 160 P.2d 987 (1945); Martin v. District Court, 129 Colo.
27, 272 P.2d 648 (1954). Weihofen, Insanity as a Criminal Defense in Colorado, 9 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
213 (1942).
162a Goldstein and Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1061 (1962).
Bush v. Texas, 353 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. Week 3128
(U.S. Oct. 16, 1962) (No. 75) raises the question whether an indigent accused has a constitutional
right, in a state court, to the appointment of a psychiatrist when an insanity defense is raised.
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has been held not to be exclusive as to the state or the defendant."'
Under these circumstances, in order to avoid current abuses, the
district attorney should be compelled to require his psychiatrists
to reveal the source of their employment, the purpose of the exam-
ination and the consequences likely to result, e.g., giving testimony
based on the interview.
The adversary process is not well adapted to fostering rational
decisions when highly technical issues and emotionally charged
facts are involved. The spectacle of partisan experts, emotionally
involved relatives and friends, and confused lawyers trying to
determine a defendant's mental condition is often appalling. Con-
ceding the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of radical change, the
law should attempt to approximate calm, dispassionate decisions
within the present framework.
One suggestion, easily accomplished, is to require the district
attorney and the defendant to share freely, in advance of trial,
all the evidence available on the mental condition of the defendant.
Ultimately, a panel of impartial psychiatrists and psychologists
should be available. The district attorney and the defendant should,
under court supervision, be required to utilize a limited number
of experts from such panel to the exclusion of any other experts.
The expenses involved can be shared if the defendant is financially
able.
Until such time as we have a device which diminishes the
"shopping for experts," there should be the freest possible pre-
trial exchange of data. The benefits of avoiding surprise, shabby
and intimidating tactics, and creating an atmosphere of honest
inquiry should be immediately obvious.
E. Testimony
In all states but three, the opinion of a layman on the sanity of
the defendant is admissible in evidence.164 There is some question
as to who is an expert and who is a layman in this context. For
example, is a qualified clinical psychologist an expert for this
purpose? Must a medical doctor be a specialist in nervous and
mental disorders?
There is no Colorado case directly on point concerning the
psychologists. A judge of the Denver District Court recently
refused to allow two clinical psychologists to testify as experts.
They did testify as laymen because the court felt that giving an
opinion, as an expert, on insanity constituted the practice of
medicine and required a medical license. 165 The weight of authority
elsewhere is clearly to the contrary. 16 When a clinical psychologist
is properly qualified he should be able to testify as an expert on
the question of sanity. He administers a battery of objective tests
which are standardized, accepted and used by many psychiatrists.
His entire training is devoted to evaluating human personality.
163 Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 352 P.2d 112 (1960). This case indicates real possibilities for
abuse by the district attorney. Two doctors were hired and examined the defendant prior to
arraignment. The entire procedure had an aura of deception and calculated abuse of defendant's
civil rights. The dissent properly condemned this procedure.
164 New York, Maine and Massachusetts. The Mentally Disabled and the Law, op. cit. supra
note 142, at 352.
16, This occured in the unreported case of People v. French, Denver District Court. Neil Horan
1., (1962). See Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 192, §108A-1-1 et. seq. for Psychologists Licensing and
Regulation Act.
16678 A.L.R.2d 919 (1961).
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Two Colorado cases reveal that psychologists gave testimony
at the trial. The court did not indicate any disapproval of this
procedure. 167 If the trial judge carefully weighs the psychologist's
qualifications and experience, there is no valid reason for not
qualifying him as an expert.
The Colorado statute requires that the court-appointed doctor
and those who perform the examination at the hospital be special-
ists in mental diseases. 168 A privately-retained doctor's ethics may
permit him to express an expert opinion in a field in which he does
not practice and has no special training. Only physicians with
special training in mental disorders or considerable clinical exper-
ience should be qualified as experts on a sanity question.
Colorado, along with the great majority of states, permits a non-
expert to give his opinion on the question of sanity. Such a witness
must show some adequate means of becoming acquainted with the
person involved, he must detail the facts and circumstances con-
cerning his acquaintanceship and the acts, conduct and conversation
upon which his conclusion concerning sanity is based.169 A non-
expert may never base his opinion on a purely hypothetical ques-
tion. 170 His opinion is, in short, based on personal observation of
such duration and kind that the trial court is satisfied with his basis
of observation.
The trial court has great discretion in allowing non-expert
opinion. There is, for example, no abuse of discretion, in refusing
to permit a lay opinion where such a witness did not see or know
defendant until immediately after the crime and the acquaintance
was of short duration. 17' Proximity in time to the crime is an im-
portant condition precedent for a lay witness to establish.1 72
There are several instances where lay opinion has been more
persuasive than expert opinion. 173 A shocking crime and a defendant
who does not dramatically display his illness will combine to create
jury receptivity for non-expert opinion. The expert's courtroom
demeanor is also a significant factor. 174
The practice of permitting a layman to express an opinion
concerning a medical condition which vexes psychiatrists is highly
questionable. The popular conception of mental illness includes a
complete breakdown of intellect, a loss of reason, and a serious loss
of self-control. 175 The mass media project an image of a wild-eyed,
disheveled individual who is incoherent and completely out of touch
with reality. This is likely to condition the public's image. Psychia-
trists know that the manifestations of mental disorder are many
167 Early v. People, 142 Colo. 462, 352 P.2d 112 (1960); Hommil v. People, 145 Colo. 577, 361
P.2d 117 (1961).
168 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-2 (Supp. 1961).
169 Turley v. People, 73 Colo. 518, 216 Pac. 536 (1923).
170 Ibid.
171 Smith v. People, 120 Colo. 39, 206 P.2d 826 (1949). Lay witnesses who met defendant more
than three months after the crime were held properly excluded. See McGonigal v. People, 74 Colo.
270, 220 Pac. 1003 (1923).
172 Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 535, 322 P.2d 674 (1958).
173 Wymer v. People, 114 Colo. 43, 160 P.2d 987 (1945). In Graham v. People, 95 Colo. 544,
38 P.2d 87 (1934), the state produced no witnesses to rebut the experts testifying that defendant
was insane. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
174 "Prosecutors tend to select psychiatrists who are conservative, more or less rigid and who
tend to identify themselves with authoritarian viewpoints and with ruling class ideology, and who
never question their premises." Roche, The Criminal Mind 112-13 (Evergreen ed. 1959).
175 Star, Shirley, The Public's Ideas About Mental Illness. Paper presented to the National Asso-
ciation for Mental Health (1955). Reprinted in Donnelly, Goldstein and Schwartz, Criminal Low
818 (1962).
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and varied. The behavior patterns include the hyper-active and
bizzare; and the passive and conforming.
176
The real danger relates to the seriously ill individual whose
behavior patterns are contrary to the popular conception of "crazy."
Most laymen are no more quafied to give an opinion on his con-
dition than they are to lecture on quantum mechanics. If a proper
foundation is laid, a layman might be qualified to recall his first-
hand impressions about the observed behavior of the defendant.
He should never go further. Ideally, providing data to the expert
outside the courtroom is probably the outer limits of a layman's
effectiveness.
The law places many obstacles in the path of the expert witness:
A physician is permitted to express his opinion based
upon facts personally observed by him, in connection with
the defendant's history given by the defendant . . . , also to
express his opinion based upon facts that are in evidence.
In the latter case the opinion is stated in answer to a hypo-
thetical question .... He cannot express an opinion based, in
whole or in part, upon information obtained from third
persons who have not testified to the facts. A defendant is
entitled to test the reliability of such statements made by a
third person . . . by cross-examining .... 177
An expert witness may testify that he referred to blood tests,
psychological testing, nurses' charts and the opinions of other
doctors. He is safe so long as he positively states that he formed his
opinion independently and did not rely upon the sources1 78 The
doctor must be careful not to mention that several of his colleagues
agreed with his opinion. This has been held, in effect, to multiply
the number of doctors asserting the opinion.17 9
The doctor's opinion is rarely the product of his exclusive efforts
and observations. It is recognized hospital procedure to make a
diagnosis based, in part, on the efforts of other specialists, such as
psychologists, neurologists, laboratory technicians and even nurses.
Frequently the entire staff observes and passes on the mental con-
dition of a patient and then the superintendent makes his report
to the court. 180 Thus, it would seem that while the doctor has
learned the correct verbal formula to avoid the strictures of the
"hearsay rule," he is often being less than honest.
The doctor should be required to state fully the various tests
which were administered, and by whom, the results and the
regularity of such procedure. He should disclose whether or not
there were staff consultations and the opinion, if any, of the staff.
If there was free pre-trial exchange of this information, as previ-
ously suggested, the defendant would be free to evaluate and
investigate any phase of the procedure. This preserves the function
,176 See generally, Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law ch. 3 (1952); Roche, The
Criminal Mind (Evergreen ed. 1959); Strecker, Ebaugh, Ewalt, Practical Clinical Psychiatry (7th ed.
1955).
177 Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 60, 6 P.2d 455, 459 (1931). See Cook v. People, 60 Colo. 263,
153 Pac. 214 (1915) on hypothetical questions.
178 Silliman v. People, 114 Colo. 130, 162 P.2d 793 (1945); Skeels v. People, 145 Colo. 281, 358
P.2d 605 (1961).
179 Carter v. People, 119 Colo. 342, 204 P.2d 147 (1949); Bauman v. People, 130 Colo. 248,
274 P.2d 591 (1954).
180 For procedure in Colorado hospitals see Weihofen, An Alternative to the Baffle of Experts:
Hospital Examination of Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 Law & Contemp. Probs. 419, 422 (1935).
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of the "hearsay rule" and allows the doctor to maintain his integrity
as a witness.18 '
A standard treatise cannot be read into evidence, or referred
to in cross-examination of an expert, unless the witness concedes
that he is familiar with it and used it to form his opinion.18 2 Counsel
advise their experts to eschew any knowledge of, or reliance upon,
such treatises.
183
The heart of the testimonial problem is posed at the dramatic
moment when counsel asks, "Now doctor will you tell us if, on the
date in question, the defendant was capable of distinguishing right
from wrong, or being able to so distinguish, was able to choose
the right and refrain from doing the wrong." The jury can disregard
the expert, and sometimes they do, but the doctor's answer to this
question is in reality an answer to the ultimate question at issue.
The defendant's responsibility is directly and inseparately related
to the answer.
184
The simple truth is that we ask the psychiatrist to make a moral
judgment about the defendant. Dr. James Galvin has affirmed in
open court that, "a psychiatrist is no more qualified to determine
the capacity of an accused to recognize right and wrong than a
plumber.' 185 Dr. Philip Roche states that in making this moral
decision, "the psychiatrist, the juryman, and the accused, have a
common genealogy of morals."'8 6
When a psychiatrist decides that the accused was, or was not,
suffering from some type of mental illness, having a temporal
connection with his unlawful act, he has gone as far as his training
allows. This is a clinical function. If all the law requires of the
doctor is a clear, clinical description of the defendant then we
cannot ask the psychiatrist to morally evaluate the defendant. This,
at the present time, is thought to be the jury's function.
Perhaps Dr. Szasz is correct when he observes that the law
utilizes the psychiatrist as a functionary on whom the trier's guilt
can be sympathetically displaced. Since "sane" and "insane" have
little meaning except whether the defendant may be punished
with a clear conscience, we probably use the doctor to dissipate
the trier's guilt feelings.'
5 7
Unless lawmakers are absolutely certain that they wish to
continue to require moral judgments from psychiatrists, modifica-
tion is in order. The criminal law would be better served if the
psychiatrist gave a clear, understandable, clinical evaluation of the
defendant and his prognosis for the future including treatability
and availability of treatment. The jury will then translate the
clinical to the moral, sane or insane. Further translation by the
181 Counsel is given great latitude in his cross-examination of on expert to see what part a
"hearsay" document played in his opinion. Adherence to the verbal formula of independent opinion
and no reliance on other's work satisfies the court. See Archino v. People, 135 Colo. 8, 307 P.2d
1083 (1957); Wooley v. People, 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1961).
182 Baker v. People, 72 Colo. 68, 209 Poc. 791 (1922).
183 This may backfire when opposing counsel reads off an imposing number of books, some
familiar to even the jury, and the expert denies any use or knowledge of them.
184 In upholding the propriety of the question, the Colorado Supreme Court distinguishes respon-
sibility from sane or insane. Brown v. People, 116 Colo. 93, 178 P.2d 948 (1947).
185 Hammil v. People, 145 Colo. 577, 584, 361 P.2d 117, 120 (1961). This remark did not dis-
qualify him from testifying.
186 Roche, The Criminal Mind 108 (Evergreen ed. 1959).
187S zasz, Some Observations on the Relationship of Low and Psychiatry, 75 Arch. of Neurolog.
and Psych. 1 (1956).
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expert will not be required. 188 This suggestion is but part of the
larger effort to place decision-making power in the most effective
position. The value of a jury system lies in having a temporary
body available which is capable of reflecting community sentiment.
Let us be clear that we do not regard mental illness per se as an
excuse for crime but that we weigh a defendant's mental illness
along with the moral disapproval of his conduct. A jury is as
qualified to perform that function as a psychiatrist.
F. Disposition After Verdict
In no state is a defendant simply set at liberty following an
acquittal by reason of insanity. The states vary from automatic
commitment, as in Colorado, to discretion of the trial judge
and even a separate trial on the issue of present insanity.'"
In Colorado, if the verdict is that the defendant was insane at
the time of the offense, the judge must immediately commit the
defendant to the State Hospital at Pueblo. 90 A full transcript of
the evidence presented at trial must accompany the order of
commitment. 191
There is no constitutional objection to the automatic commit-
ment based on a presumption of continuing insanity.' 9 2 Indeed,
it would be a highly questionable procedure which treated a
finding of insanity exactly as any other acquittal. A defendant
who successfully pleads insanity is, in effect, asking to be relieved
of criminal responsibility in return for submitting to isolation
from the public and undergoing treatment. The infliction of a past
deprivation on the community is a sufficient basis for altering his
present social relationships.
The courts are obviously not prepared to order a specific kind
of treatment or decide its duration. These decisions are properly
left to the hospital staff. The court, however, may play a pivotal
role in deciding when an individual is ready to be returned to the
community.
G. Discharge
The decision to return a person to society, after hospitalization,
is at least as important as the commitment decision. Colorado has
enacted a detailed release procedure. If the superintendent of the
hospital believes the patient is no longer insane or eligible for
probationary release, he must notify the committing judge who in
turn notifies the district attorney." The release decision is shared
with the community in this fashion.
The judge must then order the patient committed to Colorado
Psychopathic Hospital, for a term not to exceed thirty days, under
the same terms as commitment following entry of the plea.'14 If
the judge is satisfied with the reports following this observation
period, he may then release the patient unconditionally or under a
probationary release.'"; If the judge is unconvinced then he must
188 For a contrary view see, Covanaugh, Problems of a Psychiatrist in Operating Under the
M'N.ghten, Durham ond Model Penol Code Rules. 45 Marq. L. Rev. 478 (1962).
is!) See Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 365 et. seq. (1954).
] %10 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-4(2) (Supp. 1960).
.11 Ibid.
192 See 145 A.L.R. 892 (1943).
jt3 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-4(3) (Supp. 1960).
194 Ibid.
195 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-4(4) (1953).
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order a hearing with the defendant having the right to a jury.
This is a civil hearing with the patient having to prove sanity by
a preponderance of the evidence.19 6 If the jury finds him sane the
judge may still impose probationary conditions, but he must order
his discharge. If the patient's insanity is found to continue, he is
recommitted to Pueblo to await a similar release procedure in the
future. 9 7
The doctors by this procedure, must be certain they can defend
their decision to release. Aside from the merit of not giving them
the ultimate decision, this should induce careful and conservative
decisions. The community has a legitimate interest in seeking to
avoid future harm from one who has demonstrated his capacity
for causing harm. One glaring defect in the Colorado procedure is
the absence of any release standards. Must the patient now be
able to distinguish right from wrong? Must he merely be improved?
-or fully recovered?
The major considerations in this area should be the dangerous-
ness of the person and the degree of certainty required of the
prognosis sufficiently recovered.198 No criteria for dangerousness
have been clearly articulated. Dangerous behavior could, at least,
include all crimes, the same crime, only "violent" crime or violence
towards himself.19 9
"Reasonable foreseeability," not an absolute guarantee, is the
most feasible standard of certainty for the prognosis. The medical
profession is reluctant, and properly so, to guarantee any cure.
The desirability of requiring review of the doctor's release
decision seems obvious. Psychiatrists are trained to work for early
releases based on therapeutic indications. Many hospitals suffer
from unmanageable patient populations and are forced to adopt
an "in-and-out" philosophy.20 With the patient clamoring for re-
lease and the judge and district attorney being institutionally
skeptical, the psychiatrist will arrive at more precise, objective
evaluations based on his expertise and community reaction. A
case-by-case release procedure should provide the psychiatrists
with a technique for integrating therapeutic indications and com-
munity tolerance.
IV. PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY
A mental condition unable to meet the test for total criminal
irresponsibility may result in a diminution, in grade, of the offense
for which the defendant stands accused. If the offense charged
requires a mental state, e.g., specific intent, which the defendant
is unable to achieve, he should not be held responsible for such
offense. This is the doctrine of "partial responsibility," or less
accurately, "partial insanity." In theory, it should be available
in any crime requiring some specific intent. In practice, it is almost
exclusively limited to reducing first-degree murder to second-
degree murder. 201
196 Ibid.
197 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-4(5) (1953).
198 See Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458 (D.C.Cir. 1959).
199 See Goldstein and Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness-Some Observations About the
Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 Yale L.J. 225 (1960).
200 Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 189, 202-03 (1962).
201 See Perkins, Criminal Law 767-71 (1957).
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There is no logic in confining this concept to cases of homicide.
A person entering another's dwelling may not be capable of form-
ing the specific intent to commit a felony, yet be legally sane. For
the most part, the law has been unable to accomodate itself to
this situation.
There is nothing very startling about the doctrine of partial
responsibility, although the bitter polemics and mechanical appli-
cation of insanity rules have served to obscure its legal basis. Anglo-
American criminal law requires a concurrence of mens rea (the
internal fusion of thought and effort) with an act before conduct
is designated as criminal3 °2 This would suggest an "all or nothing"
doctrine of responsibility. Indeed, most states continue to view
responsibility in this fashion.
Colorado accepted the doctrine of partial responsibility in the
Brennan caseY2 3 The court said that "in behalf of the defense, in-
sanity, intoxication, or any other fact which tends to prove that
the prisoner was incapable of deliberation, was competent evidence
for the jury to weigh. '20 4 (Emphasis added.) This would suggest
that the court did not prescribe the same dimensions for "ability
to deliberate" and insanity. In Shank,2 0 5 the defense of insanity was
made to a charge of murder. The defendant requested that the
jury be instructed to acquit if he was incapable, by reason of
mental derangement, of forming an intent. This instruction was
held to be properly refused. "One who knows right from wrong
and has power to choose necessarily has power to form the intent
to choose. One who does not or has not is, in law, insane.
'206
The Shank opinion does not refer to Brennan and seems to be at
odds with it. The court equated the ability to form a specific intent
with the test for insanity without appearing to realize the implica-
tions. Two subsequent cases offered the court an opportunity to
clarify this problem.
The Ingles2 0 case indicated that if a defendant did not avail
himself of the statutory procedure for entering a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity, he Was precluded from claiming irresponsi-
bility on that ground. But such a defendant would be entitled to
introduce evidence of mental derangement, short of insanity, to
reduce the crime from murder in the first-degree to murder in
the second-degree. In Battalino2 0 8 the court modified the Ingles
decision. It was made clear that evidence of insanity, when pleaded
as a defense, may not be used to reduce the offense in grade unless
the evidence is relevant to willfulness and deliberation in the kill-
ing. The court found that whether the evidence offered on the
defense of insanity is relevant to the question of willfulness and
deliberation is a question of law for the court to decide. An instruc-
tion on second-degree murder can therefore be properly refused if
202 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 185-86 (2d ed. 1960).
203 rennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256, 86 Pac. 79 (1906). "Partial responsibility" should be dis-
tinguished from the Continental concept of "diminished responsibility." See Stewart v. United
States, 275 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C.Cir. 1960) and Weihofen, op. cit. supra note 189, at 176-77.
204 Id. at 263, 86 Pac. at 82 quoting State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 (1873).
205 Shank v. People, 79 Colo. 576, 247 Pac. 559 (1926).
206 Id. at 583, 247 Pac. at 562,
207 Ingles v. People, 92 Cola. 518, 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).
208 Battalino v. People, 118 Colo. 587, 199 P.2d 897 (1948).
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the trial judge feels the insanity evidence does not bear on the
essential elements of first-degree murder.
20 9
The Colorado cases, then, would indicate that partial responsi-
bility is recognized. The defendant must be certain that his
evidence is directed to a negation of the elements of first-degree
murder rather than proof of insanity. If the statutory procedure
for pleading insanity as a defense is not followed, then regardless
of the mental disorder present, there can be no acquittal, only a
reduction of the offense.
The Colorado statute expressly provides that in a proper case
evidence of mental condition may be offered as bearing upon the
capacity of the accused to form a specific intent essential to
constitute a crime.2 10 While the statutory language appears broad
enough to include crimes other than homicide, the cases make it
rather clear that partial responsibility is confined to homicide.
The statute gives the trial courts discretion whether there shall
first be a separate trial on the insanity issue or one trial of all the
issues. 211 The partial responsibility problem will arise if there is a
single trial, or at the trial of the substantive offense following a
verdict of sane.
Partial responsibility has a place in the theoretical framework
of the law, if only to comfort those who try the issue of guilt by
having several grades of culpability available. In the final analysis,
a finding that the defendant is guilty of second-degree murder be-
cause he could not form the specific intent is indicative of the
triers' relative moral disapproval.212 Indeed, jury findings are com-
prehensible only on the basis of a moral decision.213 The law's
problem is to revise its theoretical framework to account for the
various mental disorders and at the same time to facilitate com-
munication between law and psychiatry. Partial responsibility is
only a partial answer.
V. TOWARD A RATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
A.
First, what exactly is meant by the word responsibility? Pre-
viously, it has been used interchangeably with insanity.-1 4 Within
the contours of the present inquiry, it means little more than what
we intend to do with an offender. Responsibility is not a quality
which resides in an offender, unless, perhaps, we make some meta-
physical reference. It resembles a scale of values by which decision-
makers reckon a proper punishment.2 1 4 To decide responsibility,
the offender, his conduct and the degree and extent of the disturb-
ance are correlated with the decision-maker's scale of values.
Stated differently, responsibility means that a "normal" adult
has "caused," in a teleological sense, a proscribed "harm" and he
209 For elaboration on this theme see Berger v. People, 122 Colo. 367, 224 P.2d 228 (1950); Leick
v. People, 131 Colo. 353, 281 P.2d 806 (1955) and Becksted v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189
(1956).
210 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-1 (Supp. 1960). See Colo. R. Crim. P. 11(b).
211 Colo. Rev. Stat. §39-8-3 (Supp. 1960).
212 See Roche, The Criminal Mind 84 (Evergreen ed. 1959).
213 See Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
214 See p. 326 supra.
215 See Roche, The Criminal Mind 170 (Evergreen ed. 1959).
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is thus subject to "punishment. ' 216 Common to any approach to
responsibility is the notion that the infliction of deprivations must
be mutual. The conceptual bridge to the state's infliction of a
deprivation on an individual offender is responsibility.
Underlying any approach to reform in the criminal law is the
extent to which prevailing notions of responsibility are to be re-
tained. We move on a graduated scale between the outer dimensions
of responsibility-punishment, and care, custody and treatment.
The further we move from responsibility-punishment, the less need
there is to be concerned about revising any particular part of crim-
inal law since the underlying notion will have been revised.
2 1 7
A preference for movement in the direction of care, custody
and treatment for all persons whose behavior and clinical apearance
indicate the need is hereby acknowledged. The feasibility of attain-
ing such an ultimate goal is, of course, quite another matter. For
now, identification and articulation of the problem are sufficient.
In dealing with reform in any area one is always confronted
with a choice between immediate expediency and ultimate ideals.
The choice may be avoided, however, if reform goals are identified
in terms of immediate, intermediate and ultimate attainments. The
improbability of attaining ultimate ideals, or goals, should not
preclude stating them. If nothing else, they provide direction and
abstract policy for making contemporary decisions. Immediate and
intermediate goals are a compromise to expediency. One must con-
sider among other things, subjective elements, economics and
political pressures.
Here we shall deal with a series of questions and proposed
solutions based on what seems attainable now, in the near future
and in the remote future-or never. Review of all the arguments
about the relative merits of the Durham Rule, the Model Penal
Code or the Currens Rule is sacrificed in order to deal with more
abstract, and perhaps more fundamental questions.
218
What do we wish to accomplish with the mentally ill offender?
Who, with what qualifications, in what institutional setting, using
what procedure, should make what decisions?
Uitimately, it may be superfluous to single out for identification
the mentally ill offender. If the state's response to a deprivation
caused by a mentally ill offender is custody, care and treatment,
then it becomes sensible to create a functional classification which
includes all offenders with similar needs. This could include the
immature (youth and senility), transients, recent immigrants, per-
sons with minority sub-group values and those with exceptional
originality.2 19 The emphasis would be on adaptive re-education
216 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Low 296 (2d ed. 1961).
217 See Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, 6 Res Judicata 224 (1953).
21.1 For full citations and text of these decisions see notes 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, supra.
The following should be particularly helpful to the reader who wishes to evaluate the several
rules:
Allen, The Rule of the A.L.I.'s Model Penal Code, 45 Marq. L. Rev. 494 (1962); Raab, A
Moralist Looks at the Durham and M'N.ghten Rules, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 327 (1961); Slovenko and
Super, The Mentally Disabled, The Law, and The Report of the American Bar Foundation, 47 Va. L.
Rev. 1366, 1384 (1961); Cavanaugh, Problems of a Psychiatrist in Operating Under the M'Naghten,
Durham and Model Penal Code Rules, 45 Morq. L. Rev. 478 (1962) and Dearman, Criminal Respon-
sibility and Insanity Tests, A Psychiatrist Looks at Three Cases, 47 Va. L. Rev. 1388 (1961). See
especially, Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 189 (1962).




based on a manifested inability to assimilate and conform with
community expectations.
For the present, however, we can restrict our task to the identifi-
cation of persons with serious mental disorders who are brought
into the criminal process. The word serious will vary with time and
individual interpretations. At present, the criteria for serious mental
disorder might be an illness which so lessens an individual's ca-
pacity for control that he is unable to make responsible decisions
about his ordinary affairs and is likely to cause injury to himself
or others.220 The potential threat of harm to property could be a
part of "responsible decisions about his ordinary affairs." Emphasis
is placed on the individual's ability to form positive, or at least
non-destructive (neutral) relationships with others.
Like all verbal formulations, this one has an inherent lack of
precision. "Likely to," for example, should mean a "reasonable
probability" based on an empirically validated, expected response.
There is no pretense of originality in offering this formulation since
it is typical of many involuntary civil commitment statutes.
22'1
There is a conscious preference stated for equating the test of
criminal irresponsibility with the test for an involuntary civil
commitment. Any person who would have been given "in-patient"
treatment in a recognized hospital, without his consent, would seem
to be sufficiently disordered to avoid the ordinary criminal pro-
cesses.
B.
Criminal responsibility should not attach to persons who suffer
from serious mental disorders. Enough has been said previously to
indicate that the prevalent rules seem inadequate to the task of
identification of such persons.222 The present conceptual framework
of the defense of insanity will allow the state to detain and treat
a mentally ill offender. Existing facilities, however, are simply not
prepared to provide custody and treatment for a large segment of
our offender population.
The state must begin to expand and diversify its institutions to
accommodate larger numbers and provide a variety of custody
and treatment devices. Turning existing hospitals into prisons is
hardly a solution. The movement must be toward expansion and
diversification of facilities.
22
If a totally non-punitive system of criminal law were adopted,
we would not be concerned about the serious unofficial conse-
quences of labeling a man "criminal. ' 224 The moral condemnation
220See Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Report No. 26, p. 8 (1954). "Sec. 1 Mental
Illness shall mean an illness which so lessens the capacity of a person to use (maintain) his judgment,
discretion or control in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to warrant his commitment
to a mental institution." The GAP report concludes that the definition of mental illness should be
the test for criminal responsibility. This, of course, is the purport of the recommendation made in
this article. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-53, Report, Cmd., No. 8932 at
275-76 makes a proposal very similar to GAP's.
221 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §§71-1-1 to 71-1-5 (Sup. 1960).
222 Although the Durham Rule and the Currens Rule should ease the identification task, they
continue to exclude many serious cases and present other problems. Durham, for example, stretches
the integration of personality concept by requiring a causal connection between the act and the
disorder. Currens does not deal adequately with criteria for mental illness and is so abstract that
the transition to observational criteria is extremely difficult. Currens, however, seems for more
acceptable than Durham. See Glueck, Law and Psychiatry, Cold War or Entente Cordiale 105-07 (1962)
for an excellent test which meets these criticisms.
223 Until very recently Colorado had an able and for sighted public servant in Dr. James Galvin.
His leadership in such efforts could have made them a reality.
224 See' p. 332 supra.
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bound up in the designation "criminal"' has serious and prolonged
effects. 225 Upon release, an "ex-convict" may pay for his offense on
a never-ending installment plan.2 26 The moral stigma becomes a
focus for social and economic boycott, deprivation of civil liberties
and continued police surveillance. While the immediate, visible
results of a decision concerning criminal responsibility or irre-
sponsibility may be the same-involuntary commitmen t-the un-
official consequences would be critically different.
The unofficial consequences of redefining a person as "mentally
ill" are not really known. It seems safe to assume that since this
label implies a "sick person," the consequences will be different
in kind and degree.2 27 Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that
the mentally ill person will receive more help in a medically staffed,
non-punitive institution than in a penitentiary.
C.
Responsibility is currently decided by a jury. A verdict of sanity
means that the jury has decided the defendant deserves punish-
ment rather than help. Curiously enough, the jury is not permitted
to know, before deciding, the consequences of their decision.22 The
dimensions of such punishment will be decided by the sentencing
judge and the prison officials.
229
Ideally, the law should identify and clearly articulate the kinds
of decisions being made in the criminal process. Of immediate
concern are the decisions relating to guilt-affixing and sentencing.
It appears that radically different information and skills are needed
for these decisions.
The legal process has proven to be reasonably well adapted to
reconstructing past events through the adversary system and
deciding whether a particular rule was violated. In deciding
what to do with a man found guilty of such conduct, the law has
been notoriously deficient.230 There is little in the lawyer's back-
ground to prepare him for this decision. He may be sensitive to
the moral opinion of the community or responsive to political
pressures. Whatever his motivation, the judge will sentence in
accordance with his "gut-reaction" to the offense and offender and
his conscious or unconscious evaluation of his own potential gain
or loss.
It is proposed, based on a separation of functions and skills,
that a Sentence Imposition and Review Board be established. The
Board might be composed of four members, appointed by the
Governor, one of whom would be a lawyer, one with experience
225 Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.
2d 758 (1962), depreciated the distinction between civil and criminal commitments for narcotics
addiction.
226 Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in
the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 590 (1960).
227 See Parsons, The Social System 436-37 (1951) on the institutionalized expectation system
relative to the sick role.
228 Ingles v. People, 90 Colo. 51, 57, 6 P.2d 455, 457-58 (1931).
229 The judge must operate within the statutory limits of the offense. See Scott, Post-Conviction
Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249 (1959). Prison officials will decide
on a cell-block, job, punishment for prison infractions, etc. Placing a prisoner in "the hole" for
twenty-one days, without clothing, bedding, or other necessities and feeding him bread and water
without a "trial" is permissible. See State v. Doolittle, 22 Conn. Supp. 32, 158 A.2d 858 (1960).
230 See Seminar and Institute on Disparity of Sentencing, 30 F.R.D. 401 (1962); Pilot Institute on
Sentencing, 26 F.R.D. 231 (1959); Sentencing Institute - Fifth Circuit, 30 F.R.D. 185 1 1Q21. Gaudpt.
The Sentencing Behavior of the Judge, Encyc. of Criminology 449-61 (1949).
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in handling adult prisoners, an experienced sociologist and a
psychiatrist.23I The Board's responsibility should begin the moment
that "guilt" is ascertained in a regular judicial proceeding. Their
decisions would include the imposition of sentence, the proper
institutional assignment, periodic review to ascertain progress,
release prognosis and the release decision. Statutory minimum
sentences should be retained to protect the non-disturbed deviate
whose offense is relatively trivial.
Exhaustive information about an offender must be made avail-
able by thorough testing and investigation. A delicate balance must
be achieved between the seriousness of the defendant's behavior
and condition and the advisability of definite or indeterminate
sentences. For example, a dangerous psychotic who is caught steal-
ing a quart of milk is not irf the same position as a neurotic murder-
er. The stated preference would be to increase the use of indeter-
minate sentences while protecting the rights of even seriously
disturbed trivial offenders.
The essential idea is to separate the guilt-affixing decision from
the treatment decision; to recognize clearly the need for different
skills and information; to erect, maintain and constantly appraise
institutions suited for the different functions and to achieve a
balance between community sentiment and rational decision-mak-
ing.
For the immediate and intermediate future, we must be con-
cerned about operating within our present framework. It is pro-
posed that in all cases where a finding of insanity is made, the
defendant be given an indeterminate sentence to a mental institu-
tion. This, of course, is presently done. A Sentence Review Board
should be established to periodically review the case and ultimately
decide release, and the conditions of release. Specific criteria for
release, missing from the present statute, should be part of the
legislation creating such a Board.
The abstract release standards should be (1) the dangerousness
of the patient and (2) a medical prognosis of sufficient recovery.
'- '
"Dangerousness" might be defined in terms of any conduct which
would involve a threat of serious harm to property, other persons
or himself. There would thus be a close parallel to the admission
decision. Reference to felonies and serious misdemeanors could
provide a more specific standard.
Greater precision in a release standard may not be desirable.
The treating-releasing institution will utilize therapeutic indications
and an evaluation of the future threat to community values in-
volved. The Board can closely scrutinize the certifying doctor's
basis of opinion and thereby create an exchange of data leading to
greater precision.
The prognosis should be in terms of a reasonable probability of
recovery and a substantial lessening of any threat of "dangerous"
behavior in the future. The concern about repetition should go
beyond repetition of the original behavior involved. It is impossible
to predict, nor is it really desirable, whether a releasee will violate
some regulatory ordinance. The healing arts cannot guarantee ideal,
231 This resembles the California Adult Authority, Cal. Penal Code §5075 (Deering 1949).
28 '2 See Note. Procedure for the Release of the Criminally Insane - A Suggested Approach, Wash.
U.LQ. 120 (1962).
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or even productive, citizens. They must, however, be certain that
there is little chance of serious antisocial behavior by the releasee.
The make-up of this Board should approximate that of the
Sentence Imposition and Review Board mentioned earlier.
One serious question which relates to both Boards is whether
the judge or the district attorney should have any role in the release
decision. From a medical standpoint, it seems illogical. As a prac-
tical expediency this would give the community representatives
some control and offers assurance to the public.
For the present, to accommodate both interests, the Board's
release decision should be final. The district attorney and trial
judge should be notified in advance of any release hearing and be
permitted to present evidence to the Board .2 33 If the Board decides
to release, the district attorney should have an unqualified right
to appeal to the district court. A jury would be impaneled and
the defendant awarded a presumption of sanity based on the
Board's decision. The decision would be admissible in evidence.
The district attorney would be required to show, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the patient is "dangerous" and the
prognosis for recovery not sufficiently definite to justify release.
D.
Another major goal involves the fostering of meaningful com-
munication between law and psychiatry. At present we do not
properly use the psychiatrist; we ask the wrong questions and
receive the wrong answers. We treat insanity as though it were
a clinical reality instead of a manipulative label.
Reform need not, and indeed should not, mean the re-allocation
of important decisions to the psychiatrist. If we prohibit the ques-
tion whether the accused knew right from wrong, we diminish the
area of his decision-making responsibility. This is the moral question
which exactly parallels the ultimate issue involved and it should
no longer be asked, irrespective of whether other changes are
made.
It is not desirable to have the psychiatrist communicate exclusive-
ly in his clinical language. His specialized terminology has, no
doubt, great value in the decision-making context of private therapy.
It has doubtful value in other settings.
It is proposed that we revise the psychiatrist's function, the
questions asked him and the language of his reply. Functionally,
he should be advisory on the question of triability of the accused
and on questions of release; he should be informative and advisory
on the question of appropriate disposition of the accused; and he
should be instrumental in creating and providing techniques for
changing persons in the direction of self-awareness and reform. '2 3 4
On the question of "appropriate disposition," the doctor should
be questioned concerning diagnosis, prognosis, treatability and
availability of treatment. In providing information here, and on any
233 The judge could, for example, write a letter expressing his views rather than appearing in
person. The district attorney would be the more likely advocate in opposition to release.
2:34 See Roche, The Criminal Mind 271 (Evergreen ed. 1959).
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other issue, the doctor need not be asked whether the defendant is
neurotic, paranoid, schizophrenic or an organic reaction type. Ques-
tions he might be asked include: (1) Describe all the symptoms
involved. (2) What is the propensity for destructive behavior?
(3) What is the relation between the illness and the behavior in
question? (4) What is the probability of this person behaving in
such-and-such a manner under specified conditions? (5) How
probable is it that these conditions will occur? (6) On what do you
base these estimates? (7) What have been your opportunities, as
well as those of your colleagues whose views you take into account,
to validate estimates of this sort?
235
These questions are, of course, incomplete and merely offered
as illustrative. The phraseology of the doctor's response would, in
part, be controlled by the function being performed; the question
itself and the questioner.
The doctor who is untrained or inexperienced in psychiatry
should be precluded from playing an influential role in this area.
If psychiatric specialists are available, they must always be pre-
ferred. If a physical evaluation is necessary then, of course, the
matter is entirely different.
The lay witness, one who is untrained in psychiatry, psychology
or physical medicine; should have an extremely limited participa-
tion. He should never be asked his opinion on sanity or insanity.
If he has observational data available, then this might be com-
municated to the clinical specialist who desires it, and the jury.
Whatever system of selection of experts is used, there should
be the freest exchange of data between all the participants. A
doctor's data and opinion should not be the exclusive property of
anyone. The doctor should be free to form his opinions and answers
for a judicial or Board appearance in exactly the same way he
would in his clinical environment. The hearsay objection about
third-party reports, consultations and evaluations could be aban-
doned. Close questioning and free pre-trial exchange of data would
afford all the protection necessary.
Several areas touched upon previously have not been specifically
referred to in this section. Such problems as partial responsibility,
conditions of compulsory examination, burdens of proof, and
varying definitions of insanity would seem to be met by some of
the more abstract proposals. In some instances, an earlier expression
of opinion makes the writer's feelings clear.
There is no pretense at complete coverage of all the problems
involved, nor is it believed that all the solutions are feasible or
desirable. The current interest in the problems of criminal respon-,
sibility is a sufficient excuse for an attempt to deal with them in
an objective, if not idealistic, fashion. Further research and legis-
lative interest in the problems posed would be an adequate reward
for this effort.
235 Several of these questions are suggested by the late Professor Dession in his letter of trans-













submitted to jury 4
Found insane and








submitted to jury 0
Found insane and








submitted to jury 4
Found insane and






2 5 3 2
6 7 4 6
4 6 3 5
1958 1959 1960 1961
35 26 34 15
3 1 3 2
1 0 2 2
2 1 1 0








6 4 19 17
0 0 7 6
0 0 6 6
* Third-year law student, University of Denver. This study grew out of a Seminar in Law and Be-
havioral Sciences conductd by the author. See the earlier discussion of this study at p. 333 and
notes 56 and 61 supra.
1 Report included statutory rape. It did not include assault to rope, indecent liberties, or unnatural
carnal copulation.
2 Report included larceny by bailee and larceny of mortgaged property. It did not include conspiracy
to commit larceny or petty larceny.
3 This study was completed September 1, 1962. The defense of insanity was entered in three cases
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4 The report did not include conspiracy to commit burglary, attempted burglary, or breaking and
entering a motor vehicle.
5 See note 3 supro.
6 The report did not include "no account" check charge or conspiracy to commit forgery.
7 This study was completed September 1, 1962. The defense of insanity was entered in one case and
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